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Ivo Goldstein, Jasenovac (Zaprešić; Jasenovac: Fraktura; 
Public Institution Memorial Area Jasenovac, 2018) 958 pp., 
[32 pp.] with tables: illus., geographical maps; 24 cm 
According to many, the Jasenovac camp is still the most controversial issue 
of contemporary Croatian history. Despite the existence of extensive histori-
ographical and other literature on Ustasha crimes in the Independent State of 
Croatia (Nezavisna Država Hrvatska, NDH) and the Jasenovac camp, it has 
remained one of the most complicated historiographical topics to be further 
questioned and updated. Therefore, any new scientific effort and approach is 
welcome.
Ivo Goldstein’s latest book Jasenovac, according to the back cover copy, is 
“the first scientific monograph” on the Jasenovac camp, “written acribically”, 
which means (from Greek ἀϰρίβεıα, acribia) particularly carefully, accurately, 
precisely, scrupulously, and “responsibly, without ideological prejudices, hid-
den agenda and politicked motives”. Therefore, it is obviously a “masterpiece” 
of Croatian historiography. As Goldstein explains in his preface, he has been 
researching the Ustasha crimes committed at the time of NDH, as well as the 
scope of crimes committed in the Jasenovac camp, “for over twenty years” (p. 
21). Thus, the book Jasenovac is a result of his scientific efforts to date.
Goldstein writes that his book on Jasenovac is a book about “the hell of the 
20th century”. He confides in the reader that, while reading the most impor-
tant memories of former inmates (Berger, Ciliga, Jakovljević, Miller, Miliša, 
Nikolić, Riffer) about the Jasenovac camp, he increasingly felt like none other 
than Dante, whom “his Vergils (plural, not singular!) lead through purgatory 
and hell and carefully described people and their torments, lives and reasons 
why they were in that hell” (p. 34). Goldstein, who had previously also ex-
pressed poetic tendencies, feels like Dante, which is a bit worrying for a scien-
tist who should write without poetic passions…
According to Goldstein, the “main and most comprehensive” published 
sources for the history of the Jasenovac camp are three collections of docu-
ments edited by Antun Miletić1 (p. 30). Three collections? Well, I have to give a 
hint to Goldstein and the reviewers of his book: four collections, four (number 
4)! As Goldstein does not even list Miletić’s fourth collection of documents 
1 Antun Miletić, Koncentracioni logor Jasenovac 1941-1945: Dokumenta, Bk. I-II (Belgrade; Jase-
novac: Narodna knjiga; Spomen-područje Jasenovac, 1986); Antun Miletić, Koncentracioni logor 




on the Jasenovac Camp published in Jagodina in 20072 in the bibliography (p. 
811), he obviously does not know that it exists.
In his book Goldstein actually uses the literature in which the aforemen-
tioned fourth Miletić’s collection of documents was used, i.e. cited.3 However, 
for Goldstein to notice the aforementioned and perhaps be inspired to pur-
chase and use the said book - well - we should not expect such coherence and 
persistence from a man who, at least sometimes, feels like Dante.
On page 781 of his book, depicting the atmosphere in Yugoslavia, when 
the greatly exaggerated numbers of 700,000 or more victims of the Jasenovac 
camp were systematically presented, Goldstein states that even then “scrupu-
lous researchers” such as Antun Miletić knew how to “keep their distance”, 
even when it was “impossible to express an opinion more freely”. Thus, in the 
mid-1980s, “scrupulous” Miletić stated and published that there were no reli-
able sources that could determine how many inmates lost their lives in Jase-
novac and that this number could only be estimated on the basis of partially 
preserved sources. In relation to that, Goldstein further explains, Miletić cited 
sources which, according to Goldstein, “should show to every well-meaning 
reader” that the number of 700,000 Jasenovac victims was exaggerated.4 De-
spite that, Goldstein continues, “scrupulous” Miletić, poor man, was “an object 
of manipulation” since Vladimir Dedijer thanked Miletić in the preface to his 
book [Vatikan i Jasenovac (Vatican City and Jasenovac)] from 1987,5 stating 
that through the aforementioned Miletić’s first book of documents on Jasen-
ovac, “the suffering of hundreds of thousands killed was articulated” (p. 781).
But who is actually manipulating? Dedijer was not the one who manipu-
lated when he was thanking Miletić, but the true manipulator is - Goldstein, 
who while being acribical and scrupulous, “is forgetting” to mention what Mi-
letić wrote on page 38 of his first collection of documents Koncentracioni logor 
Jasenovac 1941-1945. [Concentration Camp Jasenovac 1941-1945] – “Therefore 
the total number of those killed on the territory of the so-called NDH accord-
ing to various sources can for now be estimated only at several hundreds of 
thousands”, and what he later clearly repeated on page 42 – “At the Ustasha 
2 Antun Miletić, Koncentracioni logor Jasenovac [1941-1945. Dokumenta], Bk. IV (Jagodina: 
Gambit, 2007).
3 For example: Vladimir Geiger, “Brojidbeni pokazatelji o žrtvama logora Jasenovac, 1941.-1945. 
(procjene, izračuni, popisi)”, Časopis za suvremenu povijest 45 (2013), no. 2: 211-242; Nikica Barić, 
“Kozara 1942. – sudbina zarobljenika, civila i djece”, Pilar: Časopis za društvene i humanističke studije 
XI (2016), no. 22 (2): 53-111; Željko Krušelj, Zarobljenici paralelnih povijesti: Hrvatsko-srpska fronta 
na prijelazu stoljeća (Zagreb: Srednja Europa, 2018).
4 Antun Miletić, “Prilog proučavanju koncentracionog logora Jasenovac – Stara Gradiška (1941-
1942)”, in: Okrugli stol 21. travnja 1984.: Materijali s rasprave, ed. Dobrila Borović (Jasenovac: 
Spomen-područje Jasenovac, 1985), pp. 18-22.
5 Vladimir Dedijer, Vatikan i Jasenovac: Dokumenti (Belgrade: Rad, 1987).
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concentration camp Jasenovac – Stara Gradiška from August 1941 to May 
1945 according to estimates several hundreds of thousands men, women and 
children were killed”.
Goldstein either intentionally ignores that or he does not know enough, 
and he should know much more since he has been dealing with the Jasenovac 
camp “for over twenty years” and he wrote “the first scientific monograph” 
on that camp. This is unusual, because when stating that Dedijer manipulated 
with Miletić (p. 781), in his footnote no. 171 (p. 929), referring to that state-
ment of his, Goldstein refers to the aforementioned book by Željko Krušelj 
Zarobljenici paralelnih povijesti [Prisoners of parallel histories], pages 40–42, 
who there put forward explanations which were in complete opposition to 
those put forward by Goldstein. So, either Goldstein is extremely rash and 
has misunderstood, misinterpreted, or incorrectly written everything, or he 
scrupulously writes in his own favour.
After everything mentioned perhaps we shall even forgive Goldstein, who 
acribically and scrupulously deals with important subjects, for simultaneously 
not taking care of some basic things like properly citing the literature he uses. 
In the very aforementioned footnote 171 (p. 929) he cites “Bulajić, Vatikan 
i Jasenovac, dokumenti” [Bulajić, “Vatican City and Jasenovac, documents”]. 
The same “work” is wrongly cited in his bibliography on page 810, too. The 
author of the book must be Vladimir Dedijer, and not [Milan] Bulajić? Be-
sides, Miletić’s article that he refers to Goldstein cites “by heart”, incorrectly: 
“Prilog proučavanju koncentracionog logora Jasenovac – Stara Gradiška (1941-
1945)” [Contribution to the study of the concentration camp Jasenovac – Stara 
Gradiška (1941-1945)], in: Okrugli stol, 21. travnja 1984. godine, Spomen-po-
dručje Jasenovac, 1985. [Round table discussion, 21 April 1984, Jasenovac Me-
morial Site, 1985], pp. 18-22. In the bibliography this article is listed on page 
823. It would be accurate as follows: “Prilog proučavanju koncentracionog 
logora Jasenovac – Stara Gradiška (1941-1942)” [Contribution to the study of 
the concentration camp Jasenovac – Stara Gradiška (1941-1942)] etc.
Anyone even slightly better informed clearly understands that the impor-
tant place in the systematic spread of the “Jasenovac myth” is assumed exact-
ly by the works of Antun Miletić, a colonel in the former Yugoslav People’s 
Army, a persistent long-time advocate of the thesis that at least several hun-
dred thousand, perhaps even 700,000 people lost their lives in the Jasenovac 
camp. To Goldstein, however, Miletić is a “scrupulous researcher” (pages 211, 
781), which means (lat. scrupulosus) overly accurate, extremely cautious, and 




When, at the very beginning of the book, Goldstein writes hastily and con-
fusedly that in Yugoslavia there was an exaggerated number of 700,000 Jase-
novac victims, he goes on and utterly inconsistently explains to us that “such 
narratives and the general situation” in the places suffered in the “Ustasha 
and Chetnik genocide actions” created an impression that these crimes were 
being ignored, intentionally forgotten, and that they “should not be talked and 
written about” because the authorities at the time wanted to portray the Nazis 
and fascists as “the main criminals” and “domestic quislings as secondary 
actors” (p. 28). So, according to Goldstein, on one hand, the 700,000 victims 
of the Jasenovac camp were greatly exaggerated and lied about, while on the 
other, the Ustasha crimes were not to be talked about? If 700,000 people were 
killed in Jasenovac alone, how can “domestic quislings” be “secondary actors”?
It is enough to merely flip through the book by the best Serbian expert on 
the numerous and almost incomprehensible literature on the Jasenovac camp 
Jovan Mirković  Objavljeni izvori i literatura o jasenovačkim logorima [Pub-
lished Sources and Literature on the Jasenovac camps] 6, which Goldstein listed 
in his bibliography (p. 823),  to realize what and how much was written and 
published about Ustasha crimes in NDH and about the Jasenovac camp, and 
whether the Ustashas during Yugoslavia were portrayed as “secondary actors”. 
As for the list of casualties of World War II and the manipulation of figures 
on these casualties in Yugoslavia, Goldstein should have consulted, which of 
course he did not, relevant and inevitable papers, such as articles by Srđan Bo-
gosavljević7, Mate Rupić8 and Nenad Lajbenšperger9, and perhaps some things 
would become clearer to him.
Goldstein would occasionally also assume the rhetoric of a Croatian 
nationalist to attack the “Belgrade downtown” (čaršija), which in the 1980s 
spread the thesis that the partisans deliberately did not want to liberate Jase-
novac (p. 644). But elsewhere Goldstein alone would take on the same “argu-
ments”. For example, he cited Jovanka, the wife of Yugoslav President Josip 
Broz Tito, that “the entire leadership” after the war “set aside” the Jasenovac 
6 Jovan Mirković, Objavljeni izvori i literatura o jasenovačkim logorima (Laktaši; Banja Luka; Bel-
grade: GrafoMark; Besjeda; Muzej žrtava genocida, 2000).
7 Srđan Bogosavljević, “Nerasvetljeni genocide”, in: Srpska strana rata: Trauma i katarza u istori-
jskom pamćenju, ed. Nebojša Popov (Belgrade: Republika, 1996), 159-170 or Srđan Bogosavljević, 
“Drugi svetski rat – žrtve. Jugoslavija”, in: Dijalog povjesničara/istoričara, Vol. 4, eds. Hans-Georg 
Fleck and Igor Graovac (Zagreb: Friedrich Naumann Stiftung, 2001), pp. 487-507.
8 Mate Rupić, “Popis žrtava Drugoga svjetskog rata u Hrvatskoj iz 1950. godine”, in: Dijalog pov-
jesničara/istoričara, Vol. 4, ed. Hans-Georg Fleck and Igor Graovac (Zagreb: Friedrich Naumann 
Stiftung, 2001), 539-552 or Mate Rupić, “Ljudski gubici Hrvatske u Drugom svjetskom ratu prema 
popisu iz 1950. godine”, Časopis za suvremenu povijest 33 (2001), br. 1: 7-18.
9 Nenad Lajbenšperger, “Presenting and Establishing the Number of Yugoslav Casualties of 
World War II from Liberation until 1951”, Tokovi istorije (2017), no. 3: 143-166.
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issue, and so the issue of Jasenovac and its victims “was taken lightly” (p. 
799). Indeed, in communist Yugoslavia this issue was “taken lightly” - only 
the death toll of the Jasenovac camp was pushed to more than half a million. 
Too bad Goldstein did not read the book by Heike Karge Steinerne Erinnerung 
– versteinerte Erinnerung? Kriegsgedenken in Jugoslawien (1947-1970)10 more 
carefully, in which case his conclusion might have been somewhat different.
To present systematically and seriously how the number of 700,000 Jase-
novac casualties arose in Yugoslavia, what in that regime was generally the 
attitude towards the victims of World War II – that, unfortunately, truly does 
require scrupulousness, it requires work, it requires effort. Goldstein, who con-
siders colonel Miletić “scrupulous”, quotes instead writer Miljenko Jergović, 
who on one occasion said that Auschwitz was “a terrible and final place”, so on 
the basis of that Goldstein concluded that Jasenovac and Auschwitz “differed 
in a few elements” (page 23). However, when Goldstein paraphrases Jergović in 
his book, it is of equal weight as if in my historiographical works I paraphrased 
the opinion of the winner of the renowned Croatian literary award Kiklop 
Nives Zeljković Celzijus. Namely, Jergović is not known to be an authority on 
Nazi crimes and the Holocaust, nor on relevant judgements on Auschwitz. 
Aren’t there historians and scholars of related professions who are nonetheless 
more relevant?
At the beginning of the book, Goldstein mentioned that during commu-
nist Yugoslavia, “suggestive metaphors” were used in connection with Jasen-
ovac about “bloodthirsty slayers” and “crazed criminals” (p. 28). Besides, per-
haps we should have waited until 1991 for the Belgrade media to start talking 
about the “bloodthirsty” Ustashas, that is, Tuđman’s slayers. And what are 
Goldstein’s metaphors like? He writes about “shameless deceits” (p. 48), “deep-
ly immoral tasks” (p. 49), “the depth of hell” (p. 432),”’the bottom of hell” (p. 
567), etc. ...
The fact actually is that Goldstein “scrupulously” uses a plethora of sug-
gestive metaphors. A good example is his chapter “Koljači na terenu” [“Slayers 
in the field”] (pp. 414-475), about Ustasha perpetrators of crimes in Jaseno-
vac. Thus, in the statements they gave in communism and in the shadow of 
more than half a million Jasenovac victims, Goldstein would leave witnesses to 
“evaluate” the slaughterers, and he would only “scrupulously” quote them: “in-
telligent sadists” (p. 422), “pagan bastard” (p. 423), “executioner” (p. 426), “exe-
cutioner” (p. 427), “ripper” (p. 428), “criminal priest” (p. 429), “Ustasha villain” 
(p. 430), “the most dangerous slayer” (p. 432), “the greatest villain” (p. 434), 
10 Heike Karge, Steinerne Erinnerung – versteinerte Erinnerung? Kriegsgedenken in Jugoslawien 
(1947-1970), Balkanologische Veröffentlichungen des Osteuropa-Instituts an der Freien Universität 
Berlin, Band 49 (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2010).
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“humans – beasts” (p. 434), “the main brute” (p. 438), “the greatest villain” 
‘(p. 438), “beast” (p. 438), “executioner” (p. 440), “the most bloodthirsty kill-
er” (p. 440), “brute” and “executioner” (p. 442), “chief brute” (p. 444), “severe 
slayer” (p. 446), “chief brute” (p. 446), “the toughest villain” (p. 447), “the most 
famous executioner” (p. 447), “the most vicious and bloodthirsty criminal” 
(p. 447), “the greatest villain” (p. 448), “butcher” (p. 448), “the chief brute” (p. 
448), “the chief brute” (p. 449), “the Satan himself” (p. 452), “human beasts” 
(p. 453), “the toughest villain” (p. 453), “butchers” (p. 455), “snake” (p. 455), 
“leader of bloodsuckers” (p. 455), “she drank and whored only with the Usta-
shas” (p. 456), “true criminal” (p. 458), “woman-beast” (p. 460), “the greatest 
executioner/brute” (p. 461), “the greatest executioner” (p. 461), “the Jasenovac 
executioners” (p. 466), “famous executioner and slayer” (p. 467), “slayer” (p. 
469), “senile sadist” (p. 471), “the chief of slayers”, “the best slayer” ( p. 472), 
“covert torture”, “slayer”, “boss of the slayers” (p. 474), “greater torturer” (p. 
475), “brut” (p. 475).
It would be wise for Goldstein to use, and to quote, the same or similar 
means of expression, both when writing about communist crimes, and when 
mentioning Josip Broz Tito in that context. However, contrary to the epithets 
mentioned above, Goldstein would call the communist systematic and ruth-
less confrontation with the enemy in Croatia, and elsewhere in Yugoslavia, at 
the end of and after the Second World War merely an “aberration”11 [from lat. 
aberratio, deviation from the course, system defect].
Even if we ignore that such Goldstein’s writing is tedious and boring, the 
bigger problem is that behind such assessments, there is actually a lack of a 
better explanation, some kind of response regarding the violence and its per-
petrators in Jasenovac based on better quality methodology. Instead, we got 
a poorly written biographical lexicon of “Ustasha slayers”. Everyone is there, 
on the number. Petar Brzica and other Ustashas were betting who would kill 
more Serbs, so in one day he “allegedly” managed to kill 1360 of them, which 
was a “record” (p. 428). It certainly is a real record. One day has 24 hours, or 
1440 minutes, so fast Brzica killed an average of one Serb almost every minute, 
without any break or rest. There is also a certain Maričić, whose exact first 
name Goldstein did not even identify, but he did mention that the said gentle-
man wore a moustache “à la Menjou” (p. 432), and Goldstein, the master of im-
portant details, then explained to us that this refers to the kind of moustache 
worn by American actor Adolphe Menjou (p. 884). There is also some Ustasha 
scented with “the elegant and famous perfume chypre” (p. 431). Goldstein 
does not forget Ustasha Mujo Jusić, who had made for himself a “Damascus 
11 “Ivo Goldstein: Istinu o Jasenovcu zna svatko tko želi”, https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/
ivo-goldstein-jasenovac-logor-/29198835.html, accessed on November 20, 2018.
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sabre weighing 5 kg, which had to be held with both hands” (p. 443), and in 
the whole story the key information is that of Ustasha Stjepan Bosak, who had 
big feet, so - believe it or not - he wore shoes size 52 (p. 443).
In the book, Goldstein describes Jasenovac (and Stara Gradiška) as an ex-
ample of “the hell of the 20th century”, as an “apocalypse”, etc. But, in fact, 
his incessant desire to depict this hell eventually made him contradictory and 
sometimes even grotesque. By listing horrors, Goldstein eventually creates an 
impression contrary to that he intended. The more alert reader does not know 
how to believe what Goldstein writes, among other things, because Goldstein 
contradicts himself.
So, for example, we can firstly find out that regular drinking water was 
available to detainees in minimal quantities (p. 257), but then we learn that a 
doctor ordered one sick inmate to drink tea, but he wanted water, so another 
detainee gave him “a litre or two of water” (p. 344). So, first there is no water, 
then it is supplied plentifully, and even tea can be drunk… Regarding the ty-
phoid epidemic in Jasenovac at the end of 1942, Goldstein concludes that the 
camp administration sought to “cover up the epidemic before the authorities 
in Zagreb” (p. 269). Since Goldstein himself stated a few pages before (p. 266) 
that the Ustasha Defence at the end of November 1942 requested disinfectants 
from the authorities in Zagreb to suppress the typhoid epidemic at the camp,12 
it remains unclear how this epidemic was intended to be “covered up”? There 
is no logic here, except for Goldstein’s “logic” that the Ustashas, apart from 
slaughtering, were also lying and covering things up... Likewise Goldstein will 
do his best to explain to us that the life conditions of inmates in terms of diet, 
personal hygiene and all other existential issues were inhuman, below the level 
of survival. And then Goldstein would blurt out that mothers who were in 
the camp with their children bathed these children every day, washed their 
diapers and prepared food (p. 299). So how is that possible when there was no 
food, no water, no conditions for maintaining personal hygiene?
 Goldstein states that some Ustashas killed prisoners in Jasenovac with 
explanations which were “monstrous”, for instance because of escape attempts 
or escape of some other prisoners (p. 323). Well then, if Ustashas in Jasenovac 
anyhow killed mercilessly, why would then be so “monstrous” if they killed a 
prisoner for an attempt to escape or because other prisoners escaped? This is 
a good example of how Goldstein increasingly overuses “heavy” epithets, and 
eventually becomes counter-productive in relation to his mission to depict 
hell.  Eh, Dante, Dante! Instead of being shocked by the brutality of Ustasha 
butchers, the reader in the end scoffs at Goldstein’s pathetic phrasing…




In the flood of Goldstein’s quotes, everyone will find something for them-
selves. Thus, he first estimates that for the inmates it was “the most difficult” 
to get used to “the proximity of death” (p. 301), but then he contradicts himself 
quoting the memories of Jasenovac survivors who say that “everyone” sent to 
Jasenovac “felt” it was the “final stop of their lives”, that is, the closeness of 
death in the camp made them allegedly “feel toughness instead of fear” (p. 
338). On the other hand, Goldstein is drowning in contradictions regarding 
the killings of prisoners. As he explains to us, the Ustashas in Jasenovac could 
have beaten up or killed “any detainee without any reason or cause”. But just 
a few lines later, Goldstein states that some did ask why someone had been 
killed, so the excuse was that it was a detainee trying to escape. In other words, 
even when one killed for no reason, there had to be some, even “meaningless 
reason” (p. 322). So, first, the Ustashas needed neither reason nor cause, and 
then there had to be some reason, even “meaningless”?
Elsewhere, writing about an Ustasha Mirko Runjaš “Gipsy”, Goldstein 
stated, among other things, that he “had full authority to satisfy his sadistic 
demands on detainees as much and in the manner he wanted” (p. 447). But it 
sounds pointless if, as mentioned, Goldstein had previously stated that Usta-
shas in the camp could kill “any detainee without having either reason or 
cause for that”. So why did Runjaš need some “full authority”?
It is even more ridiculous when Goldstein, describing another “field 
butcher”, Ustasha officer Ille, states it was a “public secret” that this butcher 
– “blackmailed detainees”. In fact, if Ille noticed better shoes on some in-
mate, he approached him “without shame” and said that those shoes should be 
handed over to him, and if the detainee complained to someone about it, Ille 
threatened to kill him (p. 449). The Ustashas, first we learned from Goldstein, 
could kill any detainee with impunity, but then Ille “shamelessly” asked the 
detainees their shoes, and the detainees could even “complain” to someone? So 
why didn’t Ustasha Ille simply slaughter them and take their shoes? I repeat: 
Goldstein’s terror lab is eventually transformed into a random pile of claims 
in which he denies himself.
After all, one really has to laugh when Goldstein quotes Đorđe Miliša,13 
who states that Ustasha Jakov Džal was a “known executioner”, but even here 
Goldstein intervenes, and estimates that this could be a “vague impression“, 
which Miliša anyway “attributed to anyone” (p. 455). Unlike Miliša, Gold-
stein chooses words carefully, he never uses “suggestive metaphors” ... After 
everything written Goldstein teaches us that all “participants in the genocide 
and crimes against humanity in Jasenovac” were nonetheless “people” and not 
13 Đorđe Miliša, U mučilištu – paklu Jasenovac (Zagreb: Self-published, 1945).
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“one-dimensional monsters” (p. 488). It would not be possible to conclude that 
from his earlier descriptions…
It was, in fact, German historian Alexander Korb who, in connection with 
the writing of Western historians on NDH and its, i.e. Ustasha crimes, noticed 
exactly the “discourse of pathologization” (Pathologisierungsdiskurs), whereby 
the Balkans are perceived as a distant and foreign place where the Ustashas 
commit picturesquely-exotic bloody crimes. Korb also writes about Western 
historians who uncritically cite certain sources for the description of the situ-
ation in NDH, in particular the “apologetic memoirs” of German General Ed-
mund Glaise von Horstenau14, who becomes a “crown witness” with his work 
instead of it being critically analysed and contextualized. All of the aforemen-
tioned Korb sees as a flawed approach that we should detach from.15  However, 
as Goldstein is not a historian from the West, but from our regions, he often 
succumbs to Pathologisierungsdiskurs, and he simply cannot do without the 
memoirs of Glaise von Horstenau. At the very beginning of the book, he re-
grets that his memoirs were not cited more often during Yugoslavia (p. 28).
Already at the beginning of the book, when Goldstein, in order to de-
scribe “a monstrous torturer”, Ustasha officer Viktor Tomić, uses the opinion 
of Vladimir Židovec that there was some “special kind of mystique and insan-
ity” in Tomić (p. 596), it is obvious that things will not end well, and Goldstein, 
in a Dante-like fashion, will continue using similar poetic images, for instance 
“the entire Jasenovac madness” (p. 596).
Goldstein will commit to explanations as if he were a trained psychologist 
or psychiatrist. Thus, the motives of the Ustasha hatred of the Serbs were “mul-
tiple and layered”, so Goldstein refers to Sigmund Freud and “the narcissism of 
minor differences” (p. 52). Killing with a sledgehammer or a knife was, Gold-
stein concludes, a testimony of “individual pathology” (p. 336). Afterwards, 
Goldstein estimates that Miroslav Filipović Majstorović displayed “bipolarity”, 
which is the case for persons with “severe psychopathological problems” (p. 
409). And then, after the “narcissism of minor differences” and bipolar disor-
ders, there is also a typical Goldstein-like neologism about “a typical self-ha-
tred syndrome” with Filipović Majstorović since his mother was reportedly 
Serbian (p. 401). [The self-taught parapsychological labelling of “self-hatred” 
has already been patented by Goldstein(s)  earlier, for example, to classify Er-
nest Bauer, who was a member of the NDH government and whose mother 
14 Ein General im Zwielicht: Die Erinnerungen Edmund Glaises von Horstenau, vol. 3: Deutscher 
Bevollmächtigter General in Kroatien und Zeuge des Untergangs des “Tausendjährigen Reiches”, ed. 
von Peter Broucek (Wien; Köln; Graz: Böhlau, 1988) – Croatian edition: Edmund Glaise von Hors-
tenau, Zapisi iz NDH (Zagreb: Disput, 2013).
15 Alexander Korb, Im Schatten des Weltkriegs: Massengewalt der Ustaša gegen Serben, Juden und 
Roma in Kroatien 1941–1945 (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2013), pp. 27-28.
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was of Jewish descent.]16 Thus, Goldstein concludes – a bipolar disorder with 
the syndrome of self-hatred. After that diagnosis, Goldstein will treat us with 
one of his more meaningless and sadder conclusions and inspiringly write: 
“However, the Serbian descent of Miroslav Filipović-Majstorović’s mother is 
just the most drastic example of the contradiction, tragedy and theatre of the 
absurd that pervades the history of the Jasenovac camp” (p. 401). As we are 
not inspired like Goldstein, we will have to conclude the opposite, that is, that 
the alleged Serbian origin of Filipović Majstorović’s mother is a completely 
irrelevant detail for the overall assessment of Jasenovac. At the same time, the 
most drastic example of Goldstein’s superficial scribbling is when he notices 
the “theatre of the absurd” in Jasenovac (p. 401). What is the “theatre of the 
absurd” in Jasenovac?
Goldstein will not, intriguingly, forget to mention that “some facts”, al-
though he did not specify which, suggest that Vjekoslav Luburić was homo-
sexual, although there is no “mention” of it in the “memoirs or official docu-
mentation” (p. 397). Franciscan and Ustasha Dionizije Juričev was, however, 
“among the Ustashas most active in sleeping with nuns” (p. 678). It was not 
Goldstein’s claim, but those were the rumours, and he, being so scrupulous 
and acribical, had to convey this crucial information. After these key details, 
elsewhere the profundity of Goldstein’s psychological-sociological-histori-
ographical analysis is breath-taking. Thus, he explains that the illiteracy of 
a particular person (an Ustasha villain) does not imply that the person was 
immediately violent and cruel, and there were also intelligent and educated 
persons who were “merciless criminals” (p. 422).
It seems that Goldstein’s “explanations” are arbitrary and randomly 
poured. I repeat, there is too much Pathologisierungsdiskurs at Goldstein. 
There is no broader quality pattern nor methodology that would facilitate in 
understanding Jasenovac.
“Brutality was manifested not only in the killing with a sledgehammer and 
a curved knife, but also in the fact that killers and victims often looked into 
each other’s eyes in the last moments” (p. 334), Goldstein writes and further 
describes in detail the mallet and explains how it was used for killing... Gold-
stein will, in turn, interdisciplinary link the Ustasha killing with a sledgeham-
mer in Jasenovac with the alleged ancient custom of killing old people in some 
of our parts, for example in Lika, Gorski Kotar, Dalmatian Hinterland, on 
some Adriatic islands, and in Herzegovina and Montenegro. Goldstein broad-
ly and very picturesquely, with reference to details, conveys what the ethno-
logical literature recorded on that subject (pp. 334 – 335). Goldstein writes that 
16 Cf. Ivo Goldstein, Slavko Goldstein, Holokaust u Zagrebu (Zagreb: Novi Liber; Židovska općina 
Zagreb, 2001), pp. 51-52.
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“in the depressed areas of Croatia and the wider region, there is a memory of 
the custom that the elderly who turn 60 years old (and even when they only 
turn fifty, but also eighty) are well fed, taken to the mountain and killed there 
by a family member by the stroke of a mallet or similar objects on their head 
[...]”. Goldstein also writes that in the Dinaric Alps there allegedly was a say-
ing “ripe for the axe” [I am splitting hairs, but it is not “allegedly” because it 
still exists today]. Etc., etc.... And after that and such an inspired Goldstein’s 
description and “explanation”, inevitable for understanding the crimes com-
mitted in the Jasenovac camp, there remains a puny impression, since Gold-
stein himself, somewhat regretfully, explains that researchers still have not 
“undoubtedly confirmed” the existence of the “custom of killing old people”. 
However, Goldstein further explains that this is “partly probable also because 
families sought to suppress them from the collective memory, but everything 
could not be erased”. I will allow the possibility! I also regret that my relatives 
from Bisko did not get their hands on me and bludgeon me to death on Mosor, 
so at least I would not have to read the aforementioned nonsense.
In the light of the foregoing, the attempt at a more layered explanation in 
the chapter “Banalnost jasenovačkog zla” [“The Banality of Jasenovac Evil”] 
(pp. 476-490) has yielded poor results. As the title itself suggests, Goldstein 
will first recount Hannah Arendt and what she wrote about Eichmann.17 But 
the impression remains that Goldstein came up with the first book he remem-
bered. What about studies on direct perpetrators of crimes in Nazi camps, or 
on members of German troops who carried out mass killings of Jews? Could 
using such studies and other relevant literature, by means of comparative ap-
proach, make it easier to obtain some answers about the Ustashas from Jase-
novac? Goldstein has better things to do than attentively reading articles in 
Holocaust and Genocide Studies, Yad Vashem Studies or reading various other 
globally relevant journals, collections of papers, and books. After all, in his 
book Goldstein makes no mention of any work of, for instance, Ian Kershaw. 
He even mentions Raul Hilberg18 several times in the notes, but he is not in 
the bibliography. I guess in a hurry he forgot. And who knows when all this 
was copy-pasted.
 In his book, Goldstein did not consult the essential book by Jovan Ćulibrk 
Istoriografija holokausta u Jugoslaviji [Historiography of the Holocaust in Yu-
goslavia].19 Goldstein does not consult many other works either. For example, 
17 Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (New York: The Viking 
Press, 1963).
18 Raul Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 
1961).
19 Jovan Ćulibrk, Istoriografija holokausta u Jugoslaviji (Belgrade: Institut za teološka istraživanja, 
Pravoslavni bogoslovski fakultet Univerziteta u Beogradu; Fakultet bezbednosti, Univerzitet u Be-
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when writing about the fate of the Kozara children, why didn’t he consult the 
essential book of Ćiril Petešić Dječji dom u Jastrebarskom [Children’s Home 
Jastrebarsko],20 or [to avoid being one-sided] a book by Rade Milosavljavić 
Dečji ustaški koncentracioni logor Jastrebarsko [Children Ustasha Concentra-
tion Camp Jastrebarsko]?21 When writing about the Serbs in NDH and the 
relation of the Ustashas towards Orthodoxy, why does Goldstein not consult 
the essential book by Veljko Đ. Đurić Ustaše i pravoslavlje [Ustasha and the 
Orthodox Religion],22 or his other works, regardless of whether he agrees with 
him. He neither consulted a collection of documents Srbi u Nezavisnoj Državi 
Hrvatskoj [Serbs in the Independent State of Croatia], edited by Nikola Živković 
and Petar Kačavenda.23 I cannot believe it, but in his book Goldstein does not 
even mention the essential book - an extensive collection of documents Zločini 
Nezavisne Države Hrvatske 1941.[-1945.] [Crimes of the Independent State of 
Croatia 1941 [-1945]], published in 1993 by Vojnoistorijski institut in Belgrade 
.24 So, there is a long list of books, collections of documents, journals and pa-
pers that Goldstein, in his “scrupulous” approach, neither used nor consulted, 
and - in short – he should have because they are relevant to understanding the 
issues he was addressing... However, we should not be overcritical since Gold-
stein did use some important titles. For example, there is a column by Viktor 
Ivančić published in March 2017 in Novosti [News] of the Serbian National 
Council entitled “Govno na grobu” [“Shit on the Grave”] (p. 818).
After writing a few lines about Hanna Arendt, Goldstein introduces the 
category of “genetic criminals”, defined by Italian physician Cesare Lombroso 
(1836-1909). Unfortunately, Goldstein then explains to us what a “Lombroso 
type” or a “born criminal” is. These are persons who have “low forehead, thick 
eyebrows, strong lower jaw, small eyes and strong extremities”. However, Gold-
stein complained, for most Ustasha criminals in Jasenovac there are neither 
physical descriptions nor photographs, so unfortunately it is not possible to 
determine whether they were of a “Lombroso type” (p. 477). At the end of 
this magnificent multidisciplinary analysis, he concludes that on the basis of 
ogradu, 2011) or Jovan Ćulibrk, Historiography of the Holocaust in Yugoslavia (Belgrade: The Insti-
tute for Theological Research of the Faculty of Orthodox Theology of the University of Belgrade; 
Faculty of Security Studies of the University of Belgrade, 2014).
20 Ćiril Petešić, Dječji dom u Jastrebarskom: Dokumenti (1939–1947) (Zagreb: Kršćanska sadašn-
jost, 1990).
21 Rade Milosavljević, Dečji ustaški koncentracioni logor Jastrebarsko (Jagodina: Gambit, 2009).
22 Veljko Đ. Đurić, Ustaše i pravoslavlje: Hrvatska pravoslavna crkva (Belgrade: Beletra, 1989).
23 Nikola Živković, Petar Kačavenda, Srbi u Nezavisnoj Državi Hrvatskoj: Izabrana dokumenta 
(Belgrade: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 1998).
24 Zločini na jugoslovenskim prostorima u prvom i drugom svetskom ratu: Zbornik dokumenata, 
Vol. I: Zločini Nezavisne Države Hrvatske 1941.-1945., Bk. 1: Zločini Nezavisne Države Hrvatske 1941. 
(Belgrade: Vojnoistorijski institut, 1993).
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physical descriptions and photographs (of Ustasha butchers) that do exist, it is 
“clear” that Lombroso theory, or any similar, cannot be applied to the exam-
ple of Jasenovac. - Good morning, Prof. Goldstein! Didn’t Lombroso theory 
ultimately have an impact on the Nazis and their theories on “criminal types” 
and “inferior races”, and consequently on the Nazi practices of euthanasia and 
persecution of “lower race”’?
After meddling with Lombroso and regretting that there were no photo-
graphs of the Ustashas from Jasenovac to look at their thick eyebrows, Gold-
stein goes into new “explanations”, so, for example, he mentions Daniel Jonah 
Goldhagen’s famous book Hitler’s Willing Executioners (p. 481),25 but, being 
scrupulous as he is, he writes his name inaccurately: Daniel Jonas. Gold-
stein did hear about Goldhagen, as he also heard about Arendt, Lombroso, 
and Madagascar, so he mentioned him, too. At the time, Goldhagen’s book 
aroused great attention and debate in Germany, so I guess Goldstein too was 
able to hear about it. A number of serious German and other historians have 
warned of all the simplifications, misconceptions, and wrong conclusions of 
this book.26 But, as he does not know other things, Goldstein probably does 
not know that either.
After that, Goldstein tries to give us additional explanations for the evil in 
Jasenovac because its proportions are “so terrible” that even the “most consist-
ent advocate of a rational approach” must think that there is “some other ex-
planation”. Again, that Pathologisierungsdiskurs! But Goldstein does not stop, 
so unfortunately he continues to “explain”. Thus, the Ustashas were unedu-
cated, young and pliable, all in a society where the collective is more powerful 
than the individual and in which there is a “herd mentality”, much more so 
than in “richer, more developed and more advanced environments” (p. 482). 
Great, Prof. Goldstein, that is why the partisans were different, educated, of 
mature age and unpliable, and therefore, fortunately, Germany and German 
society, which were much richer, in every way more developed and advanced, 
and undeniably more civilized and cultured, managed to avoid Adolf Hitler, 
Nazism, racial laws, and Auschwitz. A colossal conclusion.
Afterwards, on page 483 of his latest book Goldstein treats us with this 
conception: “In the culture of Jasenovac killers, the contempt and hatred of the 
“other” and the “different” were strongly expressed. And that culture, in fact 
metaculture, did not disappear in the decades after World War II, it manifest-
ed itself in the wars of the nineties, in mass and revenge killings, robbery and 
25 Daniel Jonah Goldhagen, Hitler’s Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust 
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1996).
26 Ian Kershaw, The Nazi Dictatorship: Problems and Perspectives of Interpretation, Fourth Edition 
(London: Arnold, 2000), pp. 253-262.
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arson.” Ridiculous – which is that “metaculture”, what was everything that 
happened from 1945 to the 1990s, in the decades of life in the undemocrat-
ic communist system, what influenced people’s behaviour in the wars of the 
1990s? What kind of an “explanation” is that, what is it based on?
I would be disappointed if Ivo Goldstein did not mention the “Ustasha 
plan of dealing in thirds”. Developing this theory without relying on relia-
ble sources is almost a tradition in the Goldstein family. - Slavko Goldstein 
wrote that Ustasha Vlado Singer met communist Šime Balen in May 1941 and 
told him about the Ustasha “plan of dealing in thirds”. He then wrote that “it 
seems” that the above was a “frequently mentioned and popular” formulation 
in “some Ustasha circles”. However, Slavko Goldstein wisely concluded, this 
“platitude” about “the thirds” is not originally Ustashian, but originates from 
the senior adviser to the Russian emperor, who in the early 1880s, commenting 
on the pogroms of Jews, concluded that one third of Jews from Russia should 
emigrate, one third should convert to Orthodoxy and one third should be 
killed.27
Therefore, Ivo Goldstein also writes that among the Ustashas “circulated 
the maxim”  saying that the “Serbian question” should be resolved on the prin-
ciple that “one third are to be killed, one third resettled and one third convert-
ed to Christianity”. This maxim - Goldstein writes - was never written down 
in Ustasha program files or recorded in the NDH press or legal provisions, but 
- Goldstein concludes - there is no doubt that the terror against the Serbs was 
aimed at its realization. Goldstein explains that various sources, even records 
of “well-informed contemporaries” “indirectly testify” about that. Goldstein 
mentions Hermann Neubacher, a special official of the German Reich Foreign 
Ministry for the Balkans based in Belgrade, and his book Sonderauftrag Südost 
1940-45,28 which should, probably, be a relevant source for the theory of “ the 
thirds” (pp. 51-52).
Following the wisdoms of his father Slavko, but without mentioning what 
Singer allegedly told Balen [probably the tape recording was lost], Ivo Gold-
stein educates us that the idea of “the thirds” is not the original brainchild of 
Ante Pavelić, or any of his associates, but taken over from an adviser to the 
Russian Emperor Alexander III, who proposed that idea (“resettle one third of 
the Jews, convert one third, and one third would starve to death”) as the solu-
tion of the Jewish question in Russia. As the icing on the cake, Ivo Goldstein 
scrupulously supplements his father Slavko and concludes that the Ustashas 
had “obviously” somewhere “read and simply taken over” that statement (p. 
27 Slavko Goldstein, 1941. Godina koja se vraća (Zagreb: Novi Liber, 2007), pp. 113-114.
28 Hermann Neubacher, Sonderauftrag Südost 1940-45: Bericht eines fliegenden Diplomaten (Göt-
tingen: Musterschmidt Verlag, 1956), p. 18.
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52). - So, in the absence of reliable sources, Goldstein refers to “indirect sourc-
es” and proclaims “obvious” what it is not - until proven by some serious and 
verifiable sources - that the Ustashas had taken over the notion of “the thirds” 
from the adviser to the Russian emperor.
Goldstein says in the book that NDH committed “genocide” against the 
Serbian people. Nowhere in the book has Goldstein made any theoretical ac-
count of what he regards as genocide, how the term should be explained, and 
what other authors have written about it. For him, the term genocide is self-ex-
planatory.
But let us take a look at what some authors, more serious than Goldstein, 
write about that.  In his research of mass killings in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
during 1941 and 1942, so the issue here considers violent acts perpetrated 
by NDH, but also the Chetniks, Tomislav Dulić, in a methodological intro-
duction, broadly explains and discusses the concepts of “genocide” as well as 
“intended genocide”, “ethnocide” and “massacre”, while elaborating on the 
complexity of the definition and use of the term “genocide”.29 With regard to 
the mass violence of NDH against the Serbian population, in the conclusion 
of his work Dulić says: “Whether they wanted to physically annihilate a sub-
stantial part of the [Serbian] population, thus committing genocide as they did 
against the Jews and the Roma, whether they [NDH] failed to a point where 
their actions may best be described as ‘attempted genocide’, or whether they 
committed ethnocide cannot be properly established without more compari-
sons and case studies of regions where there was less military combat”.30 The 
aforementioned German historian Korb has extensively dealt with the subject 
of mass violence of NDH against Serbian, Jewish and Roma people.31 He has 
also recently stated for the Croatian press that one should be careful when 
describing the violence of NDH against Serbs as “genocide”.32
But what does Goldstein care about what Dulić and Korb write or think, or 
some other competent scientists, because to him, this is the Ustasha genocide 
against the Serbs and that is that. The problem is, and we experienced this well 
in the late 1980s with the Serbian campaign on Croatian “genocidity”, that 
29 Tomislav Dulić, Utopias of Nation, Local Mass Killing in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1941-42, 
Studia Historica Upsaliensia 218 (Uppsala: Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis, 2005), pp. 11-24.
30 Ibid., p. 365.
31 Korb, Im Schatten des Weltkriegs.
32 Robert Bajruši, “Alexander Korb za Jutarnji: Njemački povjesničar i jedan od vodećih stručnja-
ka za povijest NDH: ‘Ovo je prava istina o broju ubijenih u Jasenovcu’” [“Alexander Korb for Jutarnji: 
German historian and one of the leading experts for the history of NDH: ‘This is the real truth about 
the number of people killed in Jasenovac’”] https://www.jutarnji.hr/vijesti/hrvatska/njemacki-pov-
jesnicar-i-jedan-od-vodecih-strucnjaka-za-povijest-ndh-ovo-je-prava-istina-o-broju-ubijenih-u-
jasenovcu/7373904/, accessed on February 16, 2019.
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qualifying NDH violence against Serbian population as “genocide” here does 
not only have the meaning of a historiographical debate but also has its cur-
rent political function. [And it is a real shame that Goldstein did not consult 
French historian Xavier Bougarel’s article “Od krivičnog zakona do memo-
randuma. Upotrebe pojma ‘genocid’ u komunističkoj Jugoslaviji“ [“From the 
Penal Law to Memorandum: The uses of the term ‘genocide’ in Communist 
Yugoslavia”33] - So there are undoubtedly well-intentioned people who will 
undoubtedly agree with Goldstein that genocide was committed against Serbs 
in NDH, but that does not mean that such claims and conclusions have a foot-
hold in the past reality.
In the book Goldstein writes about the “Jasenovac camp system”, which, 
from the end of August 1941 to April 1945, was “the central and by far the 
largest camp system on the territory of NDH”, and states that “the official 
name of the entire camp system was the Ustasha Defence - the Command of 
the Assembly camps of Jasenovac”. He further states that in the documents 
and literature the following names “were frequently used”: “Jasenovac Assem-
bly Camp, Jasenovac Concentration Camp, Jasenovac Assembly and Labour 
Camp, and Jasenovac Labour Camp”, but also states: “Although the docu-
ments at that time referred to ‘Jasenovac’, it would be more appropriate to use 
the term ‘Jasenovac camp system’, since there were five separate camp units 
marked with Roman numerals I to V, as well as the camp farms surrounding 
those five camps, which were also part of the system” (p. 81). Throughout one 
entire chapter (“Jasenovac III”, pp. 80-120), Goldstein writes extensively about 
the “Jasenovac complex”, about “five camp units - Jasenovac from I to V”, that 
is about the “Jasenovac camp system”.
However, at the end of August 1941 the first camp was founded near the 
village of Krapje, also called Camp I, and then at the beginning of September 
1941 a camp near the village of Bročice was also founded, called Camp II. 
Because of difficult terrain and constant flooding in mid-October 1941 the 
central camp was founded near Jasenovac, called also Camp III and Ciglana 
(Brickworks), to which in the middle of November 1941 the inmates from 
Krapje and Bročice, the two camps that were then closed, were transferred. 
Additionally, at the end of 1941 Kožara (Tannery), also called Camp IV, was 
founded in the village of Jasenovac , and in the former Penitentiary in Stara 
Gradiška a camp was founded, which was marked as Camp V. Camp farms 
were established in the wider vicinity of Jasenovac and Stara Gradiška, to 
33 Xavier Bougarel, “Od krivičnog zakona do memoranduma: Upotrebe pojma ‘genocid’ u komu-
nističkoj Jugoslaviji”, Političke perspektive 1 (2011), no. 2: 7-24.
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which detainees were sent to work.34 “The Tannery camp was established in 
January 1942 in Jasenovac itself, as a smaller labour camp (the so-called Tan-
nery). In fact, it was not a camp in the true sense of the word, but only a work 
detail IV or a tannery group, but it was nevertheless numbered as Jasenovac 
IV”, Goldstein states on page 83 of his book.
So, Krapje and Bročice, camps I and II founded at the end of August and 
the beginning of September 1941, ceased to exist in mid-November of the 
same year, and Tannery or Camp IV was not in fact a camp but a work detail, 
as Goldstein himself accurately concluded. Therefore, we can speak and write 
about two camps only – the Jasenovac camp (Assembly camp III) and the 
Stara Gradiška camp (Assembly camp V). Despite the fact that both camps 
were under joint command in Jasenovac, they operated almost independently, 
so from the middle of 1942 there were the “Command of the assembly camp 
in Jasenovac” and the “Command of the assembly camp in Stara Gradiška”, 
and from May 1943 the “Administration of the Assembly camp Jasenovac” and 
the “Administration of the Assembly camp Stara Gradiška”, and it remained 
so until 1945, as is undoubtedly confirmed by documents.35
Goldstein only mentions the original name (“Command of the assembly 
camp in Jasenovac”), and the above mentioned changes in the camp titles, 
which were certainly connected with the camp organization in Jasenovac and 
Stara Gradiška, he doesn’t mention at all. And since it does not fit into the 
“more appropriate” terminology that he uses - by which he tries to exagger-
ate already difficult and dark picture about the Jasenovac and Stara Gradiška 
camps - he also forgets the chronology, i.e. the moment when each Jasenovac 
camp was founded and ceased to exist. Using the term “system” in defining 
the Jasenovac camp (and Stara Gradiška) is characteristic of many Serbian his-
torians and notably publicists, who count the victims of Jasenovac and Stara 
Gradiška in hundreds of thousands… Adhering to such terminology and in-
terpretations leads to the notion that the “Jasenovac camp system” really exist-
ed, in fact in the form of five camps at the same time, Camp I, Camp II, Camp 
III, Camp IV and Camp V. Thus exaggerating, Goldstein in fact manipulates 
and misleads those who are not familiar with the subject.
At some places, the question arises as to how much Goldstein’s writing 
corresponds with actual events, even if it is not the matter of his manipulation, 
but rather ignorance. For example, Goldstein claims that the Ustashas from 
34 Mario Kevo, “Počeci logora Jasenovac”, Scrinia Slavonica 3 (2003): 471-499 and Mario Kevo, 
“Počeci jasenovačkog logora i pojmovna (terminološka) problematika Sustava jasenovačkih logora”, 
in: Dijalog povjesničara/istoričara, Vol. 9, ed. Hans-Georg Fleck and Igor Graovac (Zagreb: Friedrich 
Naumann Stiftung, 2005), pp. 573-589.
35 Miletić, Koncentracioni logor Jasenovac 1941-1945. Dokumenta, Bks. I-IV.
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Jasenovac led by Vjekoslav Luburić at the beginning of 1942 arrived in the 
village of Jablanovac where Luburić explained to the villagers that because 
of the “partisan threat” they should be evacuated “to safety”. Then the Usta-
shas killed some villagers, and deported part of them to Jasenovac and part to 
Germany (pp. 544-545). However, in the daily report of the General Staff of 
the Croatian Home Guard, based on the data received on 8 April 1942, which 
Goldstein doesn’t mention, it states that: “People of Orthodox religion from 
the v.[illage] of Jablanac (13 km southwest of Okučani) were taken by rebels to 
the v.[illage] of Orahovo (1.5 km southwest of the v.[illage] of Jablanac). Catho-
lic families moved to the v.[illage] of Mlaka (4 km southwest of the v.[illage] of 
Jablanac). The village of Jablanac is completely empty.”36
Goldstein explains that the “story about the corpses floating in the Sava 
River” had gradually become one of the most frequently mentioned stories in 
the “variety of Jasenovac horrors”, it had spread by word of mouth and in time 
it “lost its historic credibility”. Goldstein was keen to restore “the story about 
corpses floating in Sava” its former glory. There are “numerous documents” (p. 
364) about that, as Goldstein educates us. Which are they, I wonder?
Thus Goldstein writes that on “22 June 1942 the Command of the 3rd 
Home Guard Corps based in Sarajevo reported that ‘lately it has been receiv-
ing reports from the guards on the bridges that recently there have been corps-
es and carcasses floating in the Sava River (...) these bodies get stuck by the 
banks and decompose, tainting the environment” (p. 364). However, Goldstein 
deceives.
This Goldstein’s statement immediately attracts attention, but his meagre 
knowledge of the subject and terminology facilitates our job. The Command 
of the 3rd Home Guard Corps in Sarajevo did not include the part of NDH 
through which the Sava River flew, which immediately directs us to refer back 
to the source that Goldstein cited. And there we will see his readiness to cite 
only those archival sources that suited him to corroborate his claims.
The fact is that the Command of the 3rd Home Guard Corps forwarded to 
subordinate commands a circular of the General Staff of the Ministry of the 
Croatian Home Guard labelled Obći br. 10615/taj. dated 17 June 1942, which 
stated that: “The Command of the 2nd Home Guard Military District has 
been receiving reports from the guards on the bridges that recently there have 
been carcasses and corpses floating in the Sava River, some among them also 
dressed in Home Guard uniforms. These bodies get stuck by the banks and 
decompose, tainting the environment. Such an inhuman and malicious act 
36 Zbornik dokumenata i podataka o NOR-u naroda Jugoslavije, Vol. IV, Bk. 4: Borbe u Bosni i 
Hercegovini 1942 god. (Belgrade: Vojnoistoriski institut Jugoslovenske narodne armije, 1952), doc. 
no. 122.
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of mostly enemies of the state , which causes infections, must be disabled by 
banning the throw of dead bodies in rivers, controlling rivers and banks by 
administrative and military patrols, and imposing a regulation to catch and 
burry bodies on the spot.”37
So, when the document is read in its entirety, it becomes clear how much 
Goldstein is prepared to manipulate. The document does not mention any-
thing about the corpses of prisoners from Jasenovac, although it can be read 
from it that the corpses of people were cast into Sava also by members of the 
NDH units, although still mostly “enemies of the state”. It also states that some 
of the corpses may have been the home guards that the rebels killed and cast 
into Sava, which Goldstein, in need of disabling the “Ustasha propaganda”, cut 
and left out.  The apparent is the following: Goldstein either failed to properly 
master the “craft” of a historian, scholar, or he cannot resist fabricating (falsi-
fying, faking) the original document with intention to deceit.
Since Goldstein was really keen on proving that the corpses floating in the 
Sava River were those of the Jasenovac prisoners and that it was “not some fan-
tasy or propaganda”, he went on. Thus he mentioned a report by the “County 
Constabulary of County of Livac-Zapolje” directed to the Ministry of Health 
of NDH in August 1942, which states that they organized to collect bodies on 
the bridge in Bosanska Gradiška “that were passing through Sava and they 
were taken out and buried there” (pp. 364–365). In fact, it wasn’t the report of 
the “County Constabulary” but of Greater County of Livac-Zapolje dated 19 
August 1942 regarding health conditions on its territory the week before.38 The 
stated document nowhere mentioned that those were the bodies of Jasenovac 
prisoners, and it is obvious that Goldstein would not consider the possibility 
that those were  - for example - the bodies of partisans who had died there 
during July 1942 when they tried to break through the encirclement on Ko-
zara.39
Therefore, Goldstein proved absolutely nothing about the bodies from 
Jasenovac floating in Sava, except showing his readiness to “twist” sources 
to prove his point.  Anyway, he seems even more ridiculous when taken into 
consideration that, before manipulating the aforementioned documents from 
1942, he stated that the Ustashas conducted mass killings of prisoners in Grad-
ina (so they didn’t throw them into Sava), or that “mass killings” in Granik, 
37 Hrvatska [Croatia, HR]-Hrvatski državni arhiv [Croatian State Archives, HDA]-1204, Zapov-
jedništvo 6. pješačke divizije – Mostar [Command of the 6th Infantry Division – Mostar], Taj. No: 
3067/1942.
38 Miletić, Koncentracioni logor Jasenovac. Dokumenta, Bk. I, doc. no. 169.
39 Cf. Zbornik dokumenata i podataka o Narodnooslobodilačkom ratu naroda Jugoslavije, Vol. XII, 




that is on the banks of Sava, were conducted “from the end of 1943.” (p. 364). 
So if the prisoners were killed in Gradina, and in Granik only as late as the end 
of 1943, how can the NDH documents from June and August 1942 be a proof 
of (mass) casting of bodies from Jasenovac into Sava?
In the book, Goldstein ponders over the thesis of the “banality of evil” in 
Jasenovac, but at the same time the banality of his superficiality and ignorance 
is evident in the manuscript. While extensively writing about and reiterating 
the depravity and persecution of the Serbs in NDH, and about committing 
genocide against them, he accidentally mentions that Sarajevo lawyer Sava 
Besarović was “a representative of the Serbs in the Croatian State Assembly” 
in 1942 (p. 582). How could Besarović be a representative of the Serbs in NDH 
when Serbs as a nation were not recognized and officially did not exist there, 
they are referred to as “Greek-easterners”, “Orthodox”. Thus, according to 
Goldstein, the nation exposed to the genocide in NDH still had a representa-
tive in the Parliament.
According to Legal Regulations about the Croatian State Parliament from 
January 24, 1942, it is precisely determined who the members of the Parlia-
ment are, and the representatives of minorities are exclusively representatives 
of the German national group.40 Therefore, I would like to point out to Prof. 
Goldstein, the reviewers of his book and similar experts, that there were no 
representatives of Serbs in the Croatian State Parliament during NDH.
Goldstein’s way is actually an extraordinary allegory in which anything 
is possible. If he declared Sava Besarović a Serb representative in the NDH 
Parliament, should we be surprised then when he states that the circular of the 
Organizational Office of the Main Ustasha Headquarters from May 20, 1942 
was drawn up by “Minister Mladen Lorković” (pp. 43-44), when in fact the 
circular was signed by Lorković, but Blaž, as the Administrative Commander 
of the Main Ustasha Headquarters. Reviewers, where were you?
There is a great number of factual errors in the book, out of ignorance or 
negligence, and the way in which the notes are kept is, to put it mildly, prob-
lematic. Specifically, you can go through the pages of Goldstein’s book without 
coming across a single note. When you finally reach a note, it is not entirely 
clear which source Goldstein used for which claim.
Goldstein informs us that from an order of the Poglavnik’s Main Head-
quarters can be concluded that “the actual capacity of Jasenovac III Brick-
works ranged from 2,000 to 3,000 detainees, but due to constant selections 
and mass liquidations it could receive ‘an unlimited number of detainee’” (p. 
40 Cf. Ivo Perić, Hrvatski državni sabor 1848.-2000., Vol. 3: 1918.-2000. (Zagreb: Hrvatski institut 
za povijest; Hrvatski državni sabor; Dom i svijet, 2000), p. 66.
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498). Goldstein has reached this “fabrication” because he does not know how 
to read the literature he cites, and obviously he is not familiar with the content 
of some of the better known Jasenovac documents. Then, there is no order 
of the Poglavnik’s Main Headquarters from which the “actual capacity” of 
Jasenovac can be derived, but solely a circular of the Poglavnik’s Main Head-
quarters from April 27, 1942 that, according to the notification of the Ustasha 
Surveillance Service (UNS), the Jasenovac camp could receive “an unlimited 
number of detainees” and therefore to that camp should be directed “all com-
munists” who get caught while clearing certain areas. I repeat to Goldstein 
and the reviewers of his book: the “capacity” of the camp is not mentioned at 
all in this circular.
If Goldstein does not know the content of a document that has been re-
peatedly published, such as the aforementioned circular of the Poglavnik’s 
Main Headquarters, then it is obvious that knowing other relevant documents 
for him can be an insurmountable difficulty. Thus, Goldstein cites a letter from 
Stjepan Uroić, Grand Mayor of Great County of Livac and Zapolje, in which 
Uroić states that he demanded that the Ustashas strictly obey Ante Pavelić’s 
order from April 16, 1942. Goldstein then writes that the aforementioned 
“probably” refers to some “pardon provision” issued on the occasion of the 
first anniversary of the proclamation of NDH (p. 384). In fact, it is not proba-
ble but certain that Goldstein does not know the key documents for the topic 
he is dealing with.
However, Uroić was referring to the circular of the Poglavnik’s Main 
Headquarters dated April 16, 1942, entitled “Provisions for the procedure re-
garding operations (actions) to clear rebel territories”. Moreover, the said cir-
cular was also published in the literature Goldstein allegedly used. 41
Instead of being familiar with and using first-rate sources, Goldstein 
would embellish his book with third-grade, peripheral sources, thus stating 
that the Royal Yugoslav Government-in-exile in 1943 had information that 
Jasenovac was “the central camp that everyone must go through before being 
sent to other camps” (p. 26). And what other camps? - When Goldstein already 
refers to the Yugoslav royal government, it is strange that he does not wonder 
what the allegation that Jasenovac is “the central camp that everyone must go 
through” means. Does this actually mean that there was a massive exit from 
Jasenovac? Is this in the wake of the claims set forth by his fellow historian 
Stjepan Razum?
And if he does not know the contents or even about the existence of cer-
tain important documents and relevant literature, how can we expect Gold-
41 Cf. Miletić, Koncentracioni logor Jasenovac: Dokumenta, Bk. III, doc. no. 53.
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stein to know more elaborate things? ... Therefore, it is no surprise that he 
does not distinguish the Wiking operation (sending detainees from Jasenovac 
to the German camp in Zemun, and then to forced labour in Norway) from 
mobilizing the workforce in the NDH camps, which was implemented by Karl 
Petersen, German official for workforce in NDH (p. 520). Should Goldstein 
have consulted, and yet by chance he did not, the books on that,42 maybe some 
things would become somewhat clearer to him.
After that it is almost understandable that Goldstein incorrectly refers to 
certain Ustasha and home defence units. For this, many examples could be 
provided (pp. 87, 396, 398, 426, 435, 442, 548), but, with regard to that we shall 
boldly approach Goldstein’s ignorance gap just with his claim that in February 
1942 there was the Poglavnik’s Bodyguard Brigade (p. 402), although it was 
founded only in May of the same year. But he and the reviewers of his book 
could not care less for accuracy. It is no better even when it comes to the Ger-
man army in NDH. [Nevertheless, I am calm and satisfied that Goldstein does 
not mention the Battle group Geiger (Kampfgruppe Geiger) and its activities 
in NDH.] – We write by heart and as we please. Thus Goldstein explains to 
us that at some point Edmund Glaise von Horstenau took command of the 
German forces in NDH (p. 66). Professor Goldstein, General Rudolf Lüthers, 
commander of German troops in Croatia sent his regards.
Goldstein’s allegations and claims, to put it mildly, require adjusting with 
facts. Namely, on 20 October 1942, Adolf Hitler, as commander-in-chief of 
the German Armed Forces, issued an order for the reorganization of Ger-
man commands in NDH. Thus, from November 1, 1942, Lieutenant General 
Edmund Glaise von Horstenau was appointed German Plenipotentiary Gen-
eral in Croatia and, with regard to his position, powers and duties, he was 
equal to the commander of a military district, and he also assumed the task 
of organizing, arming and training the NDH armed forces. At the same time 
Lieutenant General Rudolf Lüthers was appointed Commander of German 
troops in Croatia.43 Following the foregoing, it would be too much to expect 
that Goldstein correctly spelled the surname of German “Major Huve” (p. 71). 
Let Major Huwe stand in line behind General Lüthers to correct the inaccurate 
statement.
42 Cf. Milorad Ašković, Blagoje Marinković, Ljubomir Petrović, U logorima u severnoj Norveškoj 
(Belgrade: Srpska književna zadruga, 1979), Ljubo Mlađenović, Pod šifrom Viking: Život, borba i 
stradanja jugoslovenskih interniraca u logorima u Norveškoj 1942-1945. Studijsko-dokumentarna 
monografija (Belgrade: Institut za savremenu istoriju; Republička sekcija bivših interniraca iz Nor-
veške pri SUBNOR-u Srbije, 1991) and Anna-Maria Gruenfelder, “U radni stroj velikoga Njemačkog 
Reicha!”: Prisilni radnici i radnice iz Hrvatske (Zagreb: Srednja Europa, 2007).
43 Cf. Nikica Barić, Ustroj kopnene vojske domobranstva Nezavisne Države Hrvatske, 1941.-1945. 
(Zagreb: Hrvatski institut za povijest, 2003), pp. 288-289 and sources there cited.
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It is still more interesting when Goldstein amply describes the biogra-
phy of yet another Jasenovac butcher, Mile Orešković, and mentions that he 
was nicknamed “Gandhi” (pp. 425-427). And poor me, I thought that Nikola 
Orešković, an Ustasha officer who had no connection with Jasenovac, was 
nicknamed Gandhi. But, big deal, it is all the same. Anyway, Gandhi, not 
Gandhi, Mladen, Blaž, I do not care, I write what I like ...
But if Goldstein doesn’t really know the sources and the facts, and preci-
sion is not his strong suit either, perhaps he can make valid conclusions? Let us 
look at some examples of his analytics. In several places (pp. 67, 544) Goldstein 
refers to a telegram sent by General Glaise von Horstenau to the German 718th 
Infantry Division at the end of February 1942, stating that three Ustasha com-
panies that had secured the Jasenovac camp were to be subordinated to that 
division. Based on that, Goldstein ponders whether the subordination of the 
Jasenovac Ustashas to the German army was an attempt by the Germans to 
prevent the terror of the Ustashas from Jasenovac over nearby Serb villages. In 
this wise analysis, he forgot to mention that the same telegram stated that the 
command of these Ustashas would be assumed by the very - Ustasha Captain 
Vjekoslav Luburić (whom Glaise von Horstenau could not stand). In the depth 
of the analysis rested on fragile ground, Goldstein failed to realise that maybe 
the German 718th Infantry Division needed the aforementioned Ustasha forc-
es to fight against the uprisings that took place in the Prijedor area at that time.
Certainly - later, when the Germans did in fact take command of almost 
all the Home Guard and Ustasha forces, the Ustasha Defence Division, that is, 
the Camp Defence Division, was excluded since it was part of the State Police 
Guard. Thus, as a formally “police” unit, the Ustasha division from Jasenovac 
was not under German command. Yes, that would be interesting to mention, 
but then it goes without saying that Goldstein did not write anything about it 
in his book.
After a naive and unsubstantiated interpretation of the aforementioned 
German telegram, things are in no way improved. Goldstein will show the new 
sharpness of his analytics on page 524, which reads: “Unlike the deportations 
of Serbs and Jews, where all the work, or at least its major part, was carried out 
by the Ustashas,  the deportations of the Roma were carried out primarily by 
the gendarmes and the home guards, as well as by members of Kulturbund. 
This is not accidental but is, as it seems, a result of an assessment that neither 
gendarmes nor home guards will be reluctant to take part in these actions, 
as could be presumed to possibly occur in the deportations of Serbs or Jews.”
After such conclusions, it is not “in all likelihood” but black-and-white 
that Goldstein does not know anything about the topic he is writing about. 
In the first place, why, for example, would the Home Guard participate in the 
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deportation of Jews to the camps at all? The Jews mostly lived in cities, did not 
resist arrest, so why would the home guards participate in their deportations? 
Jews could also be sent to the camps by the gendarmes, with the involvement 
of the NDH administrative authorities and the Ustasha movement bodies. On 
the other hand, it was precisely the home guards, as well as the military units 
of the German People’s Group - and not the Ustashas (I repeat: not the Usta-
shas!) - who participated in numerous deportations of the Serb population to 
the camps. So - the home guards (and the gendarmes) did not “object” when 
they participated in the deportations of the Serbs to the camps but carried 
out those deportations. Another pair of shoes is the fact that that Goldstein 
knows nothing about that, so he contemplates the alleged reluctance of home 
guards and gendarmes to participate in Serb deportations as opposed to their 
willingness to participate in Roma deportations.
By the way, since Goldstein does mention Kulturbund (Schwäbisch-
deutscher Kulturbund), the Swabian-German Cultural Alliance, the German 
minority association in the Kingdom of SHS / Yugoslavia, he should know 
that after the German Reich attacked the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in April 
1941, Kulturbund ceased to operate because in newly created states (NDH) or 
in occupied territories or territories annexed to other states (German Reich, 
Hungary), Germans were organized into German people’s groups. Thus, in 
April 1941, the German People‘s Group was formed in NDH (Die Deutsche 
Volksgruppe im Unabhängigen Staate Kroatien).44 As a professional historian, 
he should know when something happened and what it was called and he 
should use, as opposed to amateur historians, correct titles.
Undoubtedly, members of the German People’s Group in NDH also par-
ticipated in the deportations of the “unsuitable” population and other crimes, 
which later served to the new “people’s authorities” as a reason and justifica-
tion for the inhumane treatment of the German minority after World War II. 
However, I do not understand why on page 816 in the bibliography Goldstein 
listed: Geiger, Vladimir – Jurković, Ivan, Što se dogodilo s Folksdojčerima? Sud-
bina Nijemaca u bivšoj Jugoslaviji [What Happened with the Volksdeutsche? 
Destiny of the Germans in Former Yugoslavia], Zagreb, 1993, because he does 
not use the book at all in his book Jasenovac. Rightly so since it has nothing to 
do with the Jasenovac camp.
And then Goldstein will explain to us that the “direct and indirect” re-
sponsibility of Ante Pavelić for Jasenovac crimes can be “substantiated” in 
“many ways”, among others, by the fact to whom Pavelić gave decorations, 
and he gave them to many Ustashas who served in Jasenovac, but - Gold-
44 Cf. “Kulturbund”, in: Hrvatska enciklopedija, Vol. 6 (Kn–Mak), EIC August Kovačec (Zagreb: 
Leksikografski zavod “Miroslav Krleža”, 2004), p. 341.
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stein observes - in public explanations “it was never written” that an Ustasha 
received this decoration “because of his excelling in the camp” (p. 376). Af-
ter this statement, there is only one thing certain - a scrupulous conclusion. 
However, Goldstein needs to research further, and he just has to be persistent, 
so maybe he “will discover” that Pavelić officially awarded an Ustasha from 
Jasenovac with a medal “for excelling in the camp”, etc.
Unfortunately, there are many similar examples of Goldstein’s analytics. 
Thus, he informs us that NDH was at the “peak of power” at the end of 1941 
and in early 1942, meaning that its overall military, police and other forces 
were “strong enough and effective” to kill “on the spot” or carry out “mass 
arrests and deportations to camps” (p. 505). How ridiculous this “analysis” is, 
it is shown, for example, in the extensive report by the Home Guard General 
Staff  dated December 12, 1941, which, instead of the “peak of power”,  states 
that the Home Guard is unable to suppress the uprising, that it lacks sufficient 
forces and that - by looking “with eyes wide open” - one should be concerned 
about the parts of NDH in which the insurgents operate, about the loyal pop-
ulation in those parts, and the “possibility of the survival of the very operation 
of our home guards, gendarmes and Ustashas”.45
Within Goldstein’s general ignorance, his unfamiliarity with the events 
in connection with the village, that is, the municipality of Crkveni Bok, is a 
special case study.
Goldstein extensively writes about the case of the village of Crkveni Bok 
near Sunja (pp. 553-555). On October 13, 1942, the Ustashas from Jasenovac 
invaded the villages of Crkveni Bok, Ivanjski Bok and Strmen, killed a num-
ber of inhabitants, plundered the villages, and while some of the inhabitants 
managed to escape, other Serbs were taken to Jasenovac, but they were later 
released. Goldstein states that “two years later” Vjekoslav Luburić submitted a 
report on the incident (p. 554).
But in the report that Goldstein mentions, Luburić does not speak about 
the events in Crkveni Bok in October 1942, but the intrusion of the Usta-
shas into Crkveni Bok two years later, on August 27, 1944, when that village 
was burned and many residents were killed or taken away to the camp. So, to 
avoid any confusion, Luburić does not report on the events of October 1942, 
as Goldstein claims. Surprisingly, there is an extensive literature about these 
events - at least two books.46 But for Goldstein to possibly use such literature is 
45 Zbornik dokumenata i podataka o Narodnooslobodilačkom ratu jugoslovenskih naroda, Vol. V, 
Bk. 2: Borbe u Hrvatskoj 1941 god. (Belgrade: Vojnoistoriski institut Jugoslovenske narodne armije, 
1952), doc. no. 140.
46 Savo Skrobo, Ratni događaji i sjećanja: Općina Crkveni Bok u NOB-u 1941.-1945. (Sisak: 
Self-published, 2012) and Maja Kljajić Vejnović, Nikola D. Turajlić, U raljama genocida. Stradanja 
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more difficult than it was for General Lüthers to deal with Comrade Tito. So, 
I place the 1944 event in 1942. Maybe I realize that I was wrong – “two years 
later”. Where were competent reviewers to warn Goldstein about that on time?
 However, it is impossible to ignore lightly Goldstein’s claims that “two 
years later”, Vjekoslav Luburić submitted to the NDH Interior Minister a re-
port on “the crime in Crkveni Bok”. In that report, as Goldstein also states, 
Luburić also mentions the Cossacks (p. 554). And it is really tedious to point 
out Goldstein’s ignorance when it is so abundant, but he still needs to be asked 
a few questions. The first question would be: “Why would Luburić submit 
a report on the 1942 event only ‘two years later’?” Another question would 
be: “If Luburić mentions the Cossacks, what would the Cossacks be doing in 
Crkveni Bok in October 1942?” The third rhetorical question would be: “Prof. 
Goldstein, do you know how to read sources critically?”
The answers are in fact clear, banal, only for them one has to have a min-
imum of knowledge that Goldstein does not have. Thus, Luburić did not re-
port on the October 1942 events in Crkveni Bok “two years later”. After all, if 
Luburić did mention the Cossacks, and competent historians - unlike Gold-
stein - know that the German 1st Cossack Division arrived in NDH at the end 
of 1943, then Luburić apparently reported on another event. Finally, if relevant 
literature is used, 47 which Goldstein does not, then it is clear that Luburić did 
not report “two years later” about the October 1942 events in Crkveni Bok, 
but that he explained why Ustashas invaded that village in late August 1944.
When in October 1942 the Ustashas from Jasenovac invaded Crkveni 
Bok, Ivanjski Bok and Strmen, Greater County of Gora, as well as the Home 
Guard, reacted negatively to this event, considering this Ustasha action was 
a mistake that brought unrest and caused great violence and injustice to the 
then quiet and loyal villages. General Glaise von Horstenau was also against 
that action. Eventually the inhabitants of these villages were released from 
Jasenovac. About this Goldstein writes, not quite accurately: “On the news of 
the attack on the village, General Edmund Glaise von Horstenau immediately 
went to Crkveni Bok and the neighbouring plundered villages” (p. 553). But 
who directed him there? Mladen Lorković (not Blaž - a special warning to 
Prof. Goldstein) in his notes, which Goldstein surely did not use, says that he 
met General Glaise von Horstenau on October 25, 1942: “He returned from 
Crkveni Bok where he was sent to by Poglavnik with [Aleksandar] Seitz and 
stanovništva Strmena, Crkvenog Boka i Ivanjskog Boka u XX vijeku (Belgrade: Muzej žrtava genocida, 
2017).
47 Skrobo, Ratni događaji i sjećanja, pp. 169-174.
221
Review of Croatian History 16/2020, no. 1, 195-249
[Erih] Lisak to examine the position. He submitted the report to Poglavnik in 
writing.”48
In a completely different place in the book, Goldstein will, merely to write 
something, mention that in late October or early November 1942 Jasenovac 
was visited by a committee headed by Aleksandar Seitz (p. 503). As Goldstein’s 
analytics are superficial, he did not realize that the visit of the committee led 
by Seitz was probably related to the release of the people who had been brought 
to Jasenovac from the municipality of Crkveni Bok. But let us not be too strict, 
this is all negligible, since Goldstein, who, like Jackson Pollock, swings wide 
brush strokes, does not need to be warned of little things.
And so, it could be listed further, but here is just one more example of 
Goldstein’s ignorance of the sources, literature, chronology, and issues of the 
topic he is writing about. Thus, on page 600, he makes a brilliant assessment: 
“Under pressure from the Germans, Pavelić somewhat revised his policy to-
ward the Serbs: he declared them ‘Croats of the Orthodox religion’, promised 
to cease persecution and established the Croatian Orthodox Church for the 
NDH area. The Serbs were recognized the status of ‘Orthodox citizens’, they 
were invited to join the Ustasha movement, and they were conscripted into the 
army. Instead of harsh anti-Serb writings, suddenly more conciliatory tones 
appeared. The transports of Serbs to Jasenovac stopped.” There are, of course, 
quite vague and poorly worded formulations in what Goldstein writes. For 
example, where did Pavelić specifically “promise to end persecution”? In the 
TV show Dobro jutro, Hrvatska [Good morning, Croatia]? Secondly, of course 
that he founded the Croatian Orthodox Church “for the NDH area”, and not 
for the territory of Bulgaria or Greece. What kind of a category is that of “Or-
thodox citizens”? There is no such category, but there is a category of NDH 
citizens and NDH members. So, it is as if Goldstein cannot write a single line 
without making a mistake.
But all that is nothing compared to Goldstein’s underlying ignorance of 
the topic he is dealing with. Pavelić did not “revise” his policy towards the 
Serbs, so the transport of Serbs to Jasenovac “diminished”, but the “revision” 
of the policy during 1942 went hand in hand with intensive operations by the 
NDH forces against the insurgents, when mass deportations of Serbian popu-
lation to camps also took place. 
At a session of the Croatian State Assembly on February 28, 1942, regard-
ing the existing policy of forced religious conversions, Ante Pavelić declared: 
“a brother is dear regardless of his religion.” Then, on April 3, 1942 Pavelić 




decreed the establishment of the Croatian Orthodox Church,49 on June 11, 
1942 the establishment of Home Guard labour units (DORA) started, which 
were to be filled by Orthodox Christians or converted Orthodox Christians,50 
in mid-1942 the NDH authorities made a truce with certain Chetnik units,51 
and on 2 July 1942 a meeting of senior NDH officials was held in Zagreb. On 
July 20, 1942 the NDH Ministry of the Interior delivered the conclusions of 
that meeting to all authorities in the country in a secret circular under the 
subject “Calming the country – instructions”52 (needless to say, Goldstein did 
not mention that circular in his book). At the same time as all these events, 
the NDH forces conducted (independently or with the Germans) a series of 
counterinsurgency operations from Kordun via Kozara to Srijem, in which 
numerous Serb civilians were deported to camps. So - NDH was trying to 
suppress the uprising movement, with mass deportations to camps being car-
ried out, while at the same time trying to apply different methods of “peaceful 
pacification”.
Understandably, all of the above is an interesting topic for serious discus-
sion, but Goldstein will not be able to participate in it because he has serious 
problems with facts and in linking events into a cause-and-effect sequence.
Additionally, Goldstein, with some 70-something years hindsight, bur-
dened the National Liberation Army led by Comrade Tito with yet another 
new special task - to prevent NDH from deporting people to Jasenovac. As 
Goldstein explains, at the end of 1941 and the beginning of 1942 there was 
no “armed resistance” that would stop the “criminals”, since the partisans 
would strengthen and begin to “more successfully protect civilians only in the 
months to follow” (p. 505). Goldstein should only more specifically explain to 
us how the partisans managed to “more successfully” protect civilians. Didn’t 
many deportations of Serbs to camps occur exactly as a retaliation for partisan 
attacks? Where were then partisans and comrade Tito to protect those Serbs? 
But, Goldstein does not give up, so he states that partisans “resisted” the Usta-
sha deportations to caps “as much as they could” (p. 552).
 Partisans, in fact, many times could not protect people from deportations 
into camps, and it is also true that with the general expansion of the partisan 
49 Cf. Ante Pavelić, Hrvatska pravoslavna crkva (Madrid: Domovina, 1984), pp. 20, 31; Đurić, 
Ustaše i pravoslavlje, pp. 137, 141-142; Petar Požar, Hrvatska pravoslavna crkva u prošlosti i budućnos-
ti (Zagreb: Naklada Pavičić, 1996), pp. 118-120, 136.
50 Cf. Barić, Ustroj kopnene vojske domobranstva Nezavisne Države Hrvatske, p. 174.
51 Cf. Rasim Hurem, “Sporazumi o saradnji između državnih organa Nezavisne države Hrvatske 
i nekih četničkih odreda u istočnoj Bosni 1942. god.”, Prilozi: Institut za istoriju radničkog pokreta 
Sarajevo II (1966), no. 2: 285-325.
52 HR-HDA-223, Ministarstvo unutarnjih poslova NDH [Ministry of the Interior of NDH], V. T. 
No: 515/1942., I. A.
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movement the NDH authorities were not able to conduct more extensive op-
erations to deport people to camps. But it is also completely ahistorical to even 
give partisans led by the Communist Party the task of “protecting” civilians 
from deportations to camps or various kinds of retaliation. The essence of 
partisan warfare was in the spiral of violence in which the Germans or the 
Italians or NDH responded to their attacks with repression against the popu-
lation, but that did not stop the partisans, although they knew very well that 
because of their actions the target of retaliations would be exactly civilians.53 
So, contrary to Goldstein’s ahistorical politically correct concoctions, not some 
imaginary “anti-fascists” but real communists and revolutionaries were much 
more practical.
Branko Ćopić, a partisan fighter from the uprising in Bosnian Krajina in 
1941 until the end of the war, for a time also the political commissar of the 
Krupa-Sana joint detachments, a writer from whose literary works on World 
War II much more can be learned than from Goldstein’s scientific works, 
in his novel Gluvi barut [Silent Gunpowder], describing “Tiger”, a partisan 
commander, but also a communist and a revolutionary, a participant in the 
Spanish Civil War, writes that when he first saw Serbian peasants fleeing their 
village from the Ustashas,  he “sighed with evil relief” and concluded: “Eh, holy 
Ustashas!” - Because “Tiger”, contrary to Goldstein’s constructions about par-
tisans who “protect” civilians from deportation to camps, knew very well that 
only the Ustashas with their terror could inspire a “stupid peasant half-ani-
mal” to turn to “Tiger”, a professional soldier of Comrade Stalin and the revo-
lution, to “save” them from the Ustashas.54 And that is how the partisan army 
was created and the war was eventually won. And comrade Tito is certainly 
not a civil rights activist.
I am not sure that Čedomir Višnjić, one of the biggest experts on of the 
history of Serbs in Croatia during the Second World War and the post-war pe-
riod, would agree with Goldstein’s interpretation. When describing the Serbs 
in the Kordun uprising and later war events, he clearly writes: “For the mili-
tary-political leadership of the uprising at the time it was a fortunate circum-
stance that in the wartime a conflict was easily forced and provoked, and the 
people anyhow played the role of hostages in all partisan actions throughout 
the war. Namely, it is a rarely mentioned fact that Partisan units were gener-
53 Cf. Zdenko Radelić, Hrvatska u Jugoslaviji 1945. – 1991.: Od zajedništva do razlaza (Zagreb: 
Hrvatski institut za povijest; Školska knjiga, 2006), pp. 32-33 and the sources and literature listed 
therein. 
54 Branko Ćopić, Gluvi barut / Bronzana straža (Rijeka: Otokar Keršovani, 1963), p. 42.
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ally unable to really protect the people from a more serious campaign of any 
hostile army.”55
Goldstein resents historian Danijel Vojak because in the title of his book 
Stradanje Roma u Nezavisnoj Državi Hrvatskoj 1941. – 1945. [The Suffering of 
Roma in the Independent State of Croatia 1941-1945]56, as well as in the title of 
the introductory chapter in that book (“Stradanje Roma u Nezavisnoj Državi 
Hrvatskoj” [“The Suffering of Roma in the Independent State of Croatia”]), the 
term “suffering” “is striking” , “as an ugly euphemism, because it is quite clear 
that it was genocide” (p. 836, note 20). 
However, Vojak, with his co-authors Bibijana Papo and Alen Tahiri, in the 
said book – collection of documents describe not only the mass killings and 
deportations of Roma to camps and forced labour, Roma in Jasenovac, etc., but 
with the somewhat better known issue of “White Gypsies” they pay consid-
erable attention and give space to a little-known and insufficiently researched 
issues of the relations between Roma and the partisan movement, cooperation 
of Roma and the NDH authorities, and various examples of rescuing Roma 
with the help of Croats. For these reasons, “suffering” - as a term denoting en-
during hardship, pain, misery, and losing a life — is in the title. For everything 
that Roma underwent in NDH, Vojak does not walk away from the term “gen-
ocide” or “Porajmos” [Porraimos] and explains that it is “similar to the notion 
of the Holocaust” (p. 24, note 18). After all, other researchers, such as Filip 
Škiljan in Croatia57 or Dragoljub Acković in Serbia58, use the term “suffering” 
because they obviously do not consider it an “ugly euphemism”. Therefore, 
Goldstein’s criticism of the inappropriate use of the term “suffering” for what 
happened to the Roma in NDH is almost absurd.
Nevertheless, Goldstein further accuses Vojak that in the introductory 
chapter on the “suffering” – “he did not use series of documents” published in 
that book, “so his portrayal of that “suffering” [of the Roma] is unfortunately 
extremely incomplete” (p. 836, note 20). Fortunately, Goldstein’s “presenta-
tion” of the “suffering” of the Roma in his book Jasenovac is complete. Gold-
stein writes and concludes that “almost all the Roma” who lived in NDH lost 
their lives in Jasenovac (p. 536), although he previously wrote that “most of the 
White Gypsies” were exempt from persecution by the NDH authorities (pp. 
49-50). This is a very good example of Goldstein’s hypocrisy: he resents others, 
55 Čedomir Višnjić, Kordunaški proces: Fragment iz historije nestajanja (Zagreb: Srpsko kulturno 
društvo Prosvjeta, 2004), p. 76.
56 Danijel Vojak, Bibijana Papo, Alen Tahiri, Stradanje Roma u Nezavisnoj Državi Hrvatskoj 
1941.–1945. (Zagreb: Institut društvenih znanosti Ivo Pilar; Romsko nacionalno vijeće, 2015).
57 Filip Škiljan, “Stradanje Srba, Roma i Židova u virovitičkom i slatinskom kraju tijekom 1941. i 
početkom 1942. godine”, Scrinia Slavonica 10 (2010): 341-365.
58 Dragoljub Acković, Stradanje Roma u Jasenovcu (Belgrade: ABC Glas, 1994).
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while he himself is unable to avoid the ambiguities with which he falls below 
the level of scientificity.
Besides, as a rule, when Goldstein wants to be smart, he falls into the trap 
of his own ignorance. For example, he writes that Roma in NDH were called 
“‘Gypsies’, which was a pejorative term” [from the French péjoratif, a derogato-
ry word used for mockery and expressing contempt, etc.] (p. 49). And what else 
could they call them? What were they called by, shame on them, the “people’s 
authorities” of post-war Tito’s Yugoslavia? Certainly not the Roma, because 
that name became official only in 1971, as one of the decisions of the First 
Roma Congress in London!
In his latest book Jasenovac, Goldstein “mentioned” all those who do not 
think and write like him. In doing so, he only proved his own modest knowl-
edge, as well as his tendency to deceive. Thus writing about the visit of the 
delegate of the International Committee of the Red Cross Julius Schmidlin 
to the Jasenovac and Stara Gradiška camps in the summer of 1944, he tries 
to be smart so in the note 3 (p. 919) he states: “Perhaps Schmiedlin could not 
have known, but [Mario] Kevo had to know that Milo Bošković was killed two 
months and four days after Schmiedlin had left the [Jasenovac] camp in Sep-
tember 1944.” However, in his article “Posjet poslanika Međunarodnog odb-
ora Crvenog križa logorima Jasenovac i Stara Gradiška u ljeto 1944.” [“ICRC 
delegate’s visit to concentration camps of Jasenovac and Stara Gradiška in the 
summer of 1944”] published in 2008 in Časopis za suvremenu povijest [Journal 
of Contemporary History]59, which was also used by Goldstein, historian Kevo 
clearly wrote on page 557 that Milo Bošković was killed in the Jasenovac camp 
at the end of  September 1944.
After that, in note 3 (p. 919) Goldstein, in the manner of a member of 
the party committee for ideological construction, accuses Kevo of being “ig-
norant” and criticises him for using “unacceptable revisionist terminology” 
calling the NDH authorities “Croatian authorities”. Goldstein could have, and 
in fact should have consulted (and yet he does not even mention it, which I 
still cannot believe) a book - collection of documents Veze Međunarodnog 
odbora Crvenog križa i Nezavisne Države Hrvatske [Connections of the Inter-
national Committee of the Red Cross and the Independent State of Croatia] 60, 
which contains transcripts of the original archival documents, so he could 
familiarise himself with Schmidlin’s, and also with the terminology of the 
59 Mario Kevo, “Posjet poslanika Međunarodnog odbora Crvenog križa logorima Jasenovac i 
Stara Gradiška u ljeto 1944.”, Časopis za suvremenu povijest 40 (2008), no. 2: 547-585.
60 Veze Međunarodnog odbora Crvenog križa i Nezavisne Države Hrvatske: Dokumenti, Bk. 1, ed. 
Mario Kevo (Slavonski Brod; Zagreb; Jasenovac: Hrvatski institut za povijest, Podružnica za povijest 




International Committee of the Red Cross, for which, for the most part, there 
are “Croatian authorities” in Zagreb and not the “NDH authorities”. Therefore 
Kevo, well acquainted with the documents of the ICRC because he is the editor 
of the aforementioned collection of documents, uses both names in his works. 
As much as Goldstein cannot understand that - the authorities of NDH are 
“Croatian authorities”, no matter what they were like. The fact that the NDH 
authorities were not democratically elected and that a significant number of 
Croats were against these and such authorities, undoubtedly also responsible 
for the crimes, does not mean that it is “revisionist” to call them “Croatian 
authorities”.
In one of his recent articles British historian Rory Yeomans says that Dra-
go Roksandić, one of the inglorious reviewers of Goldstein’s book, suggested 
that instead of “aryanisation” of Jewish property in NDH the term “Croatian-
ization” of Jewish property should be used. (“Drago Roksandić has suggested 
to me that the term ‘Croatianisation’ should be used instead of aryanisation. 
However, Croatian economic planners, journalists and theoreticians almost 
always used the term ‘aryanisation,’ never ‘Croatianisation’” –Yeomans ex-
plains that he disobeyed Roksandić.)61 Is not this hypocrisy, two-facedness? 
- Goldstein first resents Kevo for using the term “Croatian authorities” for the 
NDH authorities, while the reviewer of Goldstein’s book Roksandić advises 
his colleagues from the whole wide world, reckless enough to listen to him, to 
declare the appropriation of Jewish property by the NDH authorities “Croa-
tianization” of that property? Perhaps it would be good for Goldstein and his 
reviewer to agree on this first, certainly in the Euro-Mediterranean context, 
and for Goldstein to hold Roksandić accountable for recommending the un-
acceptable “revisionist” terminology to his colleagues around the world, and 
at the same time he should not patronize others.
Besides, if I am to split hairs, it is unclear why Goldstein in his book, “the 
first scientific monograph” on the Jasenovac camp, so acribically refers to 
Comité International de la Croix-Rouge (French) or the International Com-
mittee of the Red Cross (English) accurately as the “International Committee 
of the Red Cross (ICRC)” (p. 455) and inaccurately as the “International Or-
ganization of the Red Cross (IORC)” (p. 709). The international organization 
– known as the “International Red Cross” (Croix-Rouge International) – is 
a completely different thing. And here in Goldstein’s book we have a third, 
non-existent option.
61 Rory Yeomans, “Purifying the Shop Floor: Kastner and Oehler Department Store as a Case 
Study of Aryanisation in Wartime Europe”, https://www.academia.edu/38133133/Purifying_the_
Shop_Floor_Kastner_and_Oehler_Department_Store_as_a_Case_Study_of_Aryanisation_in_
Wartime_Europe, accessed on February 15, 2019.
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I cannot resist offering some more examples of how Goldstein in his book 
first claims one thing and then something completely different, so that he 
turns out to be contradictory and tragicomic. Goldstein writes that “the com-
plete dependence of the Ustashas on the German master is evident” (p. 66), 
and then again the German representatives “requested” NDH to do some-
thing, but the Ustashas only “partially fulfilled” it (p. 67). So, if the Ustashas 
are completely dependent on the “German master”, how can the Germans 
“request” for something without their wish being fulfilled immediately?
The statements of the Ustashas who served in the Jasenovac camp in the 
days after the war, during the investigation before the Yugoslav authorities, 
Goldstein declares mostly “credible” (p. 31), and then, a few hundred pages lat-
er, states that these Ustashas “confessed everything, probably under pressure 
and torture by investigators” (p. 380). First I tortured you well, and then you 
mostly credibly confessed everything. Further, the Ustashas used a number of 
“brutal, but also very subtle” methods towards the detainees in Jasenovac (p. 
275), but they, compared to the Nazis, acted from “their primitive perspective” 
(p. 277). Thus, the Ustashas were very subtle, but still also primitive.
Goldstein writes that for Ljubo Miloš some said he was “limited, unin-
telligent” (p. 398), while others claimed that he was “sharp and highly intel-
ligent” (p. 399). From the autumn of 1942 Miroslav Filipović Majstorović did 
not “directly commit crimes” because “the policy had changed” and “mass 
and arbitrary killings” were no longer allowed (p. 408), but then on Christmas 
Day in 1942, during the performance of the inmates, he personally shot nine 
Jews (p. 409). In the spring of 1942, Eugen Dido Kvaternik, the commander 
of the Ustasha Surveillance Service (UNS), started, “it seems”, to “change his 
attitudes” because he realized the counterproductivity of the terror carried out 
by NDH (p. 374). This is what Goldstein writes in one place, while in another 
he writes something completely different, and concludes that the terror against 
the Serbs did not diminish even after Dido Kvaternik was removed from the 
post of the UNS commander at the end of 1942 (p. 552). 
After the described examples of Goldstein’s ignorance and lack of knowl-
edge on the subject one is almost fed up with enumerating further, but – it has 
to be done. So, regarding Ustasha officer and official of the UNS Viktor Tomić, 
Goldstein states that in August and September 1942 he was leading operations 
in Srijem “by order of Minister Artuković” (p. 451). In fact, it was not “by or-
der” of Andrija Artuković, when the “open order” for the establishment of the 
Higher Police Commission based in Vukovar and headed by Tomić was issued 
by the Poglavnik’s Headquarters, i.e. commander Slavko Kvaternik by order of 
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Ante Pavelić. This is mentioned even in the literature that Goldstein allegedly 
used. 62 But who would carefully read all those numerous books. 
While Viktor Tomić was in Srijem in August and September 1942, many 
Serb civilians were killed – “allegedly 6,000”, and the survivors were deported 
to Jasenovac (p. 451). Goldstein then changes his tune, mentioning that dur-
ing August and September “as a result of a large military-police operation” in 
Srijem and eastern Slavonia, about 6,000 people “listed by name and surname” 
were deported to Jasenovac (p. 514). Goldstein states one thing, then quickly 
changes his mind. I do not care! First, 6,000 Serbs were allegedly killed, and 
the rest were deported to Jasenovac, and then about 6,000 were deported, who 
were “listed by name and surname”. And when you look at the source he uses 
for this last claim (note 65, p. 895), there is no mention of any data on the 6,000 
persons “listed by name and surname”.  Moreover, it is stated that there is no 
exact data on how many people were deported to Jasenovac in that operation, 
but it is stated that, according to the data of the Provincial Commission to 
Investigate Crimes by the Occupiers and their Collaborators in Vojvodina, it 
is “estimated” that a total of more than 6,000 people were deported to Jasen-
ovac. To confirm that deportations were massive, only the number of people 
taken from some villages in Srijem is stated.63 So, Goldstein does not care 
what is written in the literature and sources he uses, he will adapt the content 
to his needs… Goldstein could have consulted the report of the Provincial 
Commission to Investigate Crimes by the Occupiers and their Collaborators 
in Vojvodina VII grupa masovnih zločina – logori: Zemun – Kustodija – Jasen-
ovac [VII group of mass crimes – camps: : Zemun – Kustodija – Jasenovac] from 
1947, which was after all published64, so he would establish that there is also no 
mention of the things he claims happened in the way that he claims.
Regarding the aforesaid, since he wants to be as acribical and scrupulous 
as possible, Goldstein brings data on the total number of inhabitants and the 
number of “Orthodox” inhabitants of a several Srijem villages (from where 
people were taken to Jasenovac) according to the list from 1931 (pp. 514–515), 
while in the note 65 on page 895 he refers to: “Korenčić, Naselja i stanovništvo 
SR Hrvatske 1857-1971 [Settlements and Population of the Socialist Republic 
62 Cf. Davor Kovačić, Redarstveno-obavještajni sustav Nezavisne Države Hrvatske od 1941. do 
1945. godine (Zagreb: Hrvatski institut za povijest, 2009), pp. 297-298.
63 Dušan Lazić Gojko, “Žrtve narodâ i narodnosti Srema u logoru Jasenovac (1941-1945)”, in: 
Okrugli stol 21. travnja 1984.: Materijali s rasprave, ed. Dobrila Borović (Jasenovac: Spomen-područ-
je Jasenovac, 1985), p. 91.
64 Pokrajinska komisija za utvrđivanje zločina okupatora i njihovih pomagača u Vojvodini. Zločini 
okupatora i njihovih pomagača u Vojvodini 1941-1944: VII grupa masovnih zločina (Srem). Logori 
Zemun – Kustodija – Jasenovac, ed. Drago Njegovan (Novi Sad: IK Prometej; Malo istorijsko društvo 
Novi Sad, 2016).
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of Croatia 1857–1971], at various places.” The only problem is that Mirko Ko-
renčić does not even mention national or religious structure of inhabitants 
in villages by lists, but only the number of inhabitants, and in that book – of 
course – there is no data for Srijem settlements in the Socialist Republic of Ser-
bia65 so Goldstein must have found the data on confessional affiliation some-
where else, but in his typical rush and negligence he forgot where. Reviewers, 
where were you? 
I write one thing, then another, and you, dear reader, manage and decipher 
what was it that I had thought, written and what should be concluded. No 
need to particularly point out that it is all accompanied by technical careless-
ness. Thus, on page 341, regarding the mass grave in Uskočka šuma (Uskoci 
Woods), Goldstein warns us with an exclamation mark: “see previous page”. 
And then you look at the previous page, and there is no mention whatsoever 
of Uskoci Woods. On page 552 Goldstein managed to even multiply the Usta-
sha crime, I guess he must have messed up copy-paste. He first states that in 
September 1942 the inhabitants of a large number of villages in the area of 
Bosanski Brod were deported to Jasenovac, then states that the Ustasha De-
fence continued to deport the inhabitants of villages in the wider Jasenovac 
area, and then reiterates the already mentioned villages in the Bosanski Brod 
area. So twice the same on the same page! I repeat: reviewers, where were you?
Goldstein states that “even” Serbs and Jews from Bijeljina and Zvornik 
were sent to the camp in Gospić (p. 75). So why “even” if those places were also 
part of NDH and if there also orders were received to send certain persons 
to the camp in Gospić? By the way, I cannot believe it, but Goldstein did not 
consult and does not cite, neither in the notes nor in the bibliography, the es-
sential article by Mario Kevo “Lišavanje slobode i prisilni rad u zakonodavstvu 
Nezavisne Države Hrvatske (1941.-1945.)” [“Restricting Freedom and Forced 
Labour in the Legal System of the Independent State of Croatia (1941-1945)”].66
One of the controversial issues about the human losses of Croatia, i.e. 
NDH in the Second World War, is the number of victims of the so-called 
Gospić group of camps (Gospić, Jadovno, Pag). Estimates, calculations, and 
lists of individual victims are too widely ranging from 1794 to 120,000 victims 
and vary greatly from one author to another and are largely conditioned by 
65 Cf. Mirko Korenčić, Naselja i stanovništvo Socijalističke Republike Hrvatske 1857-1971. (Zagreb: 
Jugoslavenska akademija znanosti i umjetnosti, 1979).
66 Mario Kevo, “Lišavanje slobode i prisilni rad u zakonodavstvu Nezavisne Države Hrvatske 
(1941.-1945.)”, in: Logori, zatvori i prisilni rad u Hrvatskoj/Jugoslaviji 1941.-1945. / 1945.-1951. 
Zbornik radova, eds. Vladimir Geiger, Martina Grahek Ravančić and Marica Karakaš Obradov (Za-
greb: Hrvatski institut za povijest, 2010), pp. 9-39.
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the (daily)political atmosphere. 67 Establishment, operation, and dissolution 
of the so-called Gospić group of camps is well described in historiographical, 
journalistic and memoir literature. However, previous research has not pro-
vided well-founded, unambiguous, and satisfactory answers to the important 
and unavoidable question about the number of detainees and the number of 
victims of these camps.
In the book, Ivo Goldstein states that estimates of the number of people 
killed in the “Gospić camp” differ. He thinks the total number of victims could 
be around 25,000. How did he come up with that estimate? Simply. Namely, 
he states only: “The commander of the Gospić camp system, Stjepan Rubinić, 
in 1942 told Ilija Jakovljević ‘in confidence’ that 28,700 detainees had been 
recorded on these lists, and that about 3,500 had survived. The obvious con-
clusion is that the total number of victims could be around 25,000. The vast 
majority of the victims were Serbs, about 2,500 of them were Jews. A small 
number of Croats and Roma were also killed” (p. 77).
Let us remember - according to Slavko Goldstein’s simple calculation in 
the book (co-authored with Ivo Goldstein) Holokaust u  Zagrebu [Holocaust in 
Zagreb], published in 2001,68 which he also repeats in the books published later 
(alone or co-authored with Ivo Goldstein),69 there were at least 24,000 victims 
of the so-called Gospić camp group. Slavko Goldstein’s calculation is based on 
the file of the Ustasha Disciplinary and Criminal Court on the investigation 
and court proceedings that were conducted from October 1941 to February 
1942 against Stjepan Rubinić, director of the County Police in Gospić, due to 
the alleged arbitrary closure of the Jadovno Camp. However, the file does not 
mention the number of people killed in the camp at all, but at the end of Oc-
tober 1941 Rubinić stated in the investigation only that at the time the camp 
was disbanded, in it there were “approximately 4,000 people”.70 The above cal-
culation is also based on Rubinić’s alleged statement to writer Ilija Jakovljević 
in the Stara Gradiška camp. According to this claim, which Goldstein took 
for granted, the County Police Directorate in Gospić kept accurate records of 
the arrived detainees, so according to that, from June 18 to August 23, 1941, 
a total of about 28,700 people were received, noting: “Hardly a few hundreds 
were saved. The others were killed. Add those who were not recorded in the 
67 Cf. Vladimir Geiger, Mario Jareb, Davor Kovačić, Jadovno i Šaranova jama: Kontroverze i ma-
nipulacije (Zagreb: Hrvatski institut za povijest, 2017).
68 I. Goldstein, S. Goldstein, Holokaust u Zagrebu, p. 301.
69 S. Goldstein, 1941. Godina koja se vraća, p. 240; Slavko Goldstein, Ivo Goldstein, Jasenovac i 
Bleiburg nisu isto (Zagreb: Novi Liber, 2011), pp. 25-26.
70 HR-HDA-1549, Zbirka zapisa upravnih i vojnih vlasti Nezavisne Države Hrvatske i narod-
nooslobodilačkog pokreta [Collection of records of the administrative and military authorities of 
the Independent State of Croatia and the national liberation movement], II – 91, 736-868.
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books at all […].”71  (However, this may also be Jakovljević’s assumption, as it 
contradicts Rubinić’s claim to Jakovljević that the County Police Directorate in 
Gospić kept accurate records of the detainees who arrived. It also contradicts 
Rubinić’s statement of 29 October 1941 he gave in the Ustasha Police prison 
on about 4,000 inmates at the time the Jadovno camp was disbanded.) At the 
end of August 1941, after the dissolution of the Jadovno camp, the remaining 
detainees from Gospić were sent to other camps (Jasenovac, Jastrebarsko, Lob-
orgrad, Krušćica), and several hundreds were released. As the lists of detainees 
in the Gospić-Jadovno-Pag camp have not been preserved, it is difficult, almost 
impossible, to judge the credibility of Rubinić’s testimony or Jakovljević’s al-
legations. This issue and the issue of the number of victims of the so-called 
Gospić group of camps is addressed in more detail in the mentioned book 
Jadovno i Šaranova jama: Kontroverze i manipulacije [The Jadovno Concen-
tration Camp and the Šaran Pit: Controversies and Manipulation] 72, which Ivo 
Goldstein, of course, did not use.
Slavko Goldstein wrote about “at least 24,000” victims of the Gospić 
- Jadovno - Pag camps. Ivo Goldstein now writes that the total number of 
victims “could be around 25,000”. Of course, I consider Slavko Goldstein’s 
above-mentioned calculation to be a manipulation that is not based on exact 
sources. In addition, I do not understand on what basis Goldstein increased 
the number of 24,000 by a thousand and “rounded it up” to 25,000. As I am 
not aware of any recent research on the number of victims of the so-called 
Gospić group of camps, it is obviously a “guesstimate”, a method that Ivo 
Goldstein applies in this case as well, probably guided by logic: more is better 
than less. Either way - scrupulous!
Ivo Goldstein argues that German representatives were often dissatisfied 
with and appalled by the Ustasha violence against Serbs, but - Goldstein teach-
es us - it was actually “pretence” because the Nazis did not restrain the Usta-
shas from applying measures against Roma, Jews and Communists (p. 70). Yes, 
it really was pretentious.
It is equally ridiculous when Goldstein concludes that the German envoy 
to NDH, Siegfried Kasche, when he was a member of the commission that vis-
ited Jasenovac in early 1942, in his report on that visit “knowingly concealed 
the truth” because he was “too smart and too experienced” to believe what he 
saw. Hence - Goldstein concludes - Kasche should have realized what the real 
situation in the camp was, unless “he didn’t want to or didn’t have to”. Etc., etc. 
(p. 68). Well Siegfried Kasche was not a member of the Helsinki Committee for 
Human Rights, but a representative of the German Reich! And besides, Kasche 
71 Ilija Jakovljević, Konclogor na Savi (Zagreb: Konzor, 1999), p. 328.
72 V. Geiger, M. Jareb, D. Kovačić, Jadovno i Šaranova jama.
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was one of the few German representatives who always unreluctantly defended 
the Ustashas and Pavelić.
Our prominent historian Mirjana Gross wrote: “The important difference 
is that dilettante, but sometimes also professional ideological historiography 
does not distinguish the past from the present but assesses historical figures 
as forerunners or culprits of certain important events in the present. Promi-
nent people of the past become our contemporaries, and therefore - like living 
people - eligible, ineligible, or selectively eligible. In contrast, scientific histo-
riography approaches the past as “alterity”, starting from the principle that 
intentions and activities of historical figures and events arise from completely 
different sets of circumstances than today, that they occur in special situations 
that have to be researched and presented in such a way that contemporaries 
are able to understand them.”73
Unfortunately, it seems that Goldstein did not learn this lesson. Therefore, 
he often seems ridiculous in his book.
Goldstein, unable to properly analyse the structure of the NDH govern-
ment and the differences in actions of its various bodies in different periods 
and in different parts of NDH, opted for a wise approach and adopted a “dual 
chain of command”, but also inconsistently, so he only further increased the 
already great confusion in his book. Thus, he first states that the “parallel 
chain of command” enabled the Ustashas to commit crimes, that “parallel-
ism”, i.e. a sort of dual power of the Ustasha authorities and the civilian ones, 
“perfectly” suited Pavelić and his followers because they justified some of their 
actions by law, and things outside legal framework were “covered” precisely 
by the “parallel chain of command” (p. 56). But, as many times in the book, 
Goldstein again contradicts himself. Thus, he states that after the war some 
NDH officials claimed in their defence before the Yugoslav court that there 
was a “dual system of governance” in NDH, the former being implemented 
through regular institutions and the latter outside them, and that in that latter 
system crimes were often committed. But Goldstein ingeniously concludes, it 
was a “rather unconvincing story” that the court did not believe (p. 385). Of 
course, but Goldstein himself on page 56 “established” the very existence of 
the “parallel chain of command”.
In an equally ridiculous way, Goldstein recounts the orders of German 
General Friedrich Stahl on the conduct of forces under his command dur-
ing the attack on partisans on Kozara in mid-1942. General Stahl forbade his 
troops to “burn houses, destroy and plunder property, and commit other acts 
73 Mirjana Gross, Suvremena historiografija: Korijeni, postignuća, traganja (Zagreb: Novi Liber; 
Zavod za hrvatsku povijest Filozofskog fakulteta Sveučilišta u Zagrebu, 1996), p. 380.
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of violence”, threatening to have such individuals court-martialled. Goldstein 
explains that General Stahl’s orders regarding the treatment of partisans and 
suspicious persons during the attack on Kozara were “a legal framework for 
mass deportations to Jasenovac”. So, with his orders, Stahl first widely enabled 
mass deportations to Jasenovac, and then he “strongly insisted” that the “Usta-
sha plans” for the killing of Serbs from Kozara not be implemented? After re-
alising that something was wrong here, Goldstein, understandably, wondered 
why some Nazi general would issue such orders there, and concluded that the 
course of events on Kozara “clearly” shows that the said Stahl’s order “was 
neither partially, and certainly not entirely, obeyed” (pp. 547–548).
But Goldstein again ahistorically does not understand anything. Yes, per-
haps the aforementioned order of General Stahl was not obeyed, or perhaps it 
was, but the point is in something quite different, which Goldstein is unable 
to comprehend. Namely, General Stahl really did not need robbers, maraud-
ers. What he needed was a disciplined army to create an encirclement around 
Kozara that no one would break. With such an organized force, Stahl was able 
to kill thousands of partisans and civilians and displace tens of thousands. 
But Goldstein is unable to analyse the intensity and direction of the NDH 
violence in 1941, compare it to the NDH violence in 1942, and then compare 
it all to German “mechanical” violence as practiced by General Stahl. Una-
ble to comprehend it all, break it down, compare it, Goldstein would pray on 
mischievous home guards who stole chickens, but would miss a firing squad 
of some Home Guard mountain infantry brigade that was in Kozara forests 
shooting hundreds and then displacing thousands of people…
It is even more ridiculous, almost tragicomic, when Goldstein, regarding 
the requests that people wrote to the NDH authorities to release their relatives 
from Jasenovac, states that they were written “pathetically or adulatory” since 
they were signed by a salute “For Homeland Ready” (Za dom spremni) (p. 584). 
Well, shame on those people who wrote in “adulatory” manner and signed 
their petitions with then official state greeting. Perhaps the chances for re-
lease from the camp would have been more favourable had the petitions been 
signed with “Death to fascism - freedom to the people” (Smrt fašizmu – Slo-
boda narodu). It is best for Goldstein to report those unfortunates who signed 
their petitions with “For Homeland Ready” to the competent authorities of the 
Republic of Croatia and the Croatian media.
Ivo Goldstein, formerly alongside, and now following in the footsteps 
of his father Slavko, has for years been persistently promoting the number 
of about 100,000 victims of the Jasenovac camp (somewhat less is also ok, 
but more is better). Therefore, in Croatian anti-fascist circles, the number 
of 100,000 victims of the Jasenovac camp was accepted, even though it was 
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Vladimir Žerjavić’s estimate, made without systematic research and without 
confirmation in the sources, which he then corrected and reduced to 83,000.74
In his book Jasenovac, Ivo Goldstein states that Bogoljub Kočović75 came 
to an estimate that between 150,000 and 200,000 Serbs lost their lives in the 
camps in NDH, “which later led Žerjavić76 to (quite logically) conclude that 
Kočović would estimate that around 70,000 people died in Jasenovac” (pp. 
788–789).
But Goldstein, like some other Croatian historians who take over this Žer-
javić’s allegation without checking it, did not actually consult Kočović who in 
1990 in Introduction to the Yugoslav edition of his book Žrtve Drugog svjet-
skog rata u Jugoslaviji [World War II victims in Yugoslavia] 77 clearly says: “A 
major debate has arisen over the number of victims at the Ustasha concentra-
tion camp in Jasenovac. And there my study was cited in many debates, in the 
press or on television, although I did not calculate the number of those victims 
at all. I have repeatedly stated publicly that I am not in a position to say the 
number of Serbs killed in Jasenovac, as I do not know the number of people 
killed in Bleiburg.” (p. XVI). – “I said that I do not know how many casual-
ties there were in Jasenovac”, Kočović also reiterated next to the table of his 
calculations/estimates on the human losses of Serbs on the territory of NDH. 
(p. XVIII). Žerjavić, apparently keen to confirm his calculations/estimates, 
from this table drew his conclusion on what Kočović assessed about Jasenovac. 
Goldstein, apart from the second Yugoslav edition of Kočović’s book Žrtve 
Drugog svjetskog rata u Jugoslaviji [Victims of World War II in Yugoslavia], 
did not use Kočović’s book Nauka, nacionalizam i propaganda [Science, Na-
tionalism and Propaganda], published in France in 1999,78 because he does 
not mention it in the notes or in the bibliography. If he did not get that book 
in Paris, because he had too many obligations, he could look for it in Zagreb 
in the National and University Library [Nacionalna i sveučilišna knjižnica, 
NSK]. If Goldstein had made an effort to consult the aforesaid book, he would 
have seen that on pages 147–148 Kočović emphasizes: “I have regularly refused 
to engage in discussions about the number of people killed in Jasenovac […]. 
Although I still claim that I am sure that that number is not 700,000 or more 
[…] if a number has to be given, I would say that the number for Serbs could 
be between 150,000 and 200,000, but I immediately said that I had no proof 
74 Vladimir Žerjavić, Opsesije i megalomanije oko Jasenovca i Bleiburga: Gubici stanovništva Jugo-
slavije u drugom svjetskom ratu (Zagreb: Globus, 1992), pp. 69, 72.
75 Bogoljub Kočović, Žrtve Drugog svetskog rata u Jugoslaviji (London: Naše delo, 1985).
76 Žerjavić, Opsesije i megalomanije oko Jasenovca i Bleiburga, p. 74.
77 Bogoljub Kočović, Žrtve Drugog svetskog rata u Jugoslaviji (Sarajevo: Svjetlost, 1990).
78 Bogoljub Kočović, Nauka, nacionalizam i propaganda (Između gubitaka i žrtava Drugoga svet-
skog rata u Jugoslaviji) (Paris: Editions du Titre, 1999).
235
Review of Croatian History 16/2020, no. 1, 195-249
to support that claim. I later specified that with that number I covered all the 
death camps in NDH [...] and that my above-mentioned figure covers the total 
number of casualties in all the camps on the NDH territory.”
Kočović therefore, to clarify to Goldstein, estimates that the number of 
Serbs who lost their lives in all NDH camps “can be” between 150,000 and 
200,000 and, which is of the utmost importance, Kočović also notes “I have 
no evidence for this claim”. So, if Kočović says that his figure “can be possible” 
and that “there is no evidence to support this claim”, I do not understand on 
the basis of what Goldstein claims that Žerjavić “quite logically” concluded 
that Kočović would estimate that about 70,000 people died in Jasenovac. If this 
were “quite logical”, Kočović, who “regularly refused to engage in discussions 
about the number of people killed in Jasenovac”, would – logically – estimate 
so. But it is rather illogical. As it is illogical that Goldstein had no need to 
check what exactly Kočović means and writes.
Undoubtedly, Kočović and Žerjavić are greatly responsible for destroying 
the myth of 1,700,000 human losses that Yugoslavia suffered in World War II, 
and thus the significantly exaggerated allegations about the scale of human 
losses in NDH and the casualties of the Jasenovac camp. In historiography 
they are recorded as such. Kočović did not engage in calculating the number 
of casualties of the Jasenovac camp, nor Bleiburg. Žerjavić, by contrast, was 
ensnared by excessive wants and expectations regarding the number of casu-
alties in both Bleiburg and Jasenovac, which cannot be properly resolved by 
statistical method or assessments. 
As Goldstein’s estimates of the number of the Jasenovac camp victims are 
90,000-100,000, the accuracy of Žerjavić’s calculations and estimates should be 
strengthened and confirmed at all costs, and  numerous complaints about the 
shortcomings of the list of individual victims of JUSP Jasenovac that numbers 
83,145 victims should be disregarded and minimise das much as possible79. 
And doubts regarding the number of Jasenovac victims should be over, I guess. 
In public Goldstein persistently insists that “the truth” on the Jasenovac camp 
is “more or less known, including the approximate number of victims”.80 And 
he should be the one who determines what is “true” about Jasenovac and what 
is not, and what the number of Jasenovac victims is.
Unlike Goldstein, I neither know the number of Jasenovac victims, nor 
I dare claim to know. But unlike various charlatans who keep repeating the 
79 Cf. Spomen područje Jasenovac, “Poimenični popis žrtava KCL Jasenovac 1941-1945.”, http://
www.jusp-jasenovac.hr/Default.aspx?sid=6284, accessed on February 10, 2019.
80 Ivo Goldstein, “Komisija za Jasenovac: nova besmislena inicijativa šefice države”, https://www.
jutarnji.hr/globus/Globus-komentari/pise-ivo-goldstein-komisija-za-jasenovac-nova-besmisle-
na-inicijativa-sefice-drzave/7321071/, accessed on November 20, 2018.
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figure from hundreds of thousands to millions of Jasenovac victims, or rather 
reduce the casualties to almost negligible figures of only a few thousand vic-
tims and justify them in all ways, I am aware it is not minor, moreover that it 
is a large scale of human suffering. 
For some citations and data Goldstein often does not bring references or 
refer to sources and literature, so we can only guess at the source of his state-
ments. When he writes about the “Kozara offensive” of 1942, he says: “The 
German Command of the entire action, notably General Stahl, but also Gen-
eral Glaise von Horstenau, following an order from Berlin, strongly insisted 
that healthy men and women without children be sent as a workforce to the 
[German] Reich. Although this was contrary to the Ustasha plans under which 
these people should have been liquidated, the German will was executed” (pp. 
550-551). Goldstein has no sources to support that claim. What order from 
Berlin, when and to whom was it addressed, what “strong insistence” and by 
which representatives of NDH, what “Ustasha plans”? Where are the sources 
for everything he stated? I am afraid Goldstein has concocted all of the above, 
although I cannot believe it, but he has not cited the source for these audacious 
claims. When you turn to page 900 where the sources for the aforesaid should 
be, in the note 148 it is referred to Nikica Barić’s article “Kozara 1942. – sudbi-
na zarobljenika, civila i djece [Axis Offensive on Kozara Mounatain,1942 – the 
Fate of the Prisoners of War, Civilians and Children]”, but there is nothing in 
this article about the “Berlin order”, the insistence of German generals with 
representatives of NDH and the “Ustasha plans”.
Regarding the displacement of Serbs from Kozara to the regions north of 
the Sava River, on page 550 of his book Jasenovac Goldstein writes: “About 
16,500 Kozara inhabitants were moved to the villages in Slavonia, Posavina 
and Moslavina, where, due to the mobilization of men, there was a lack of 
workforce”. Goldstein does not have any note for this claim, and he is in fact 
manipulating because relevant sources indicate that only to the territory of 
Great County of Bilogora about 16,500 people were displaced from the Ko-
zara area. Great County of Bilogora in Bjelovar on July 16, 1942 reported to 
the NDH Ministry of Interior that from 14 to 16 July 16,500 “prisoners” from 
Kozara came to its territory, of which 8,500 were located in Grubišno Polje 
and 8,000 in Garešnica. Thousands and thousands of Kozara inhabitants were 
relocated to various other places, primarily in Slavonia. Thus around 8,000 
of them were sent to the Lipik area and about 10,000 to the Požega area, but 
this probably isn’t the complete data.81 Immediately after stating that 16,500 
Serbs from Kozara were moved to Slavonija, Posavina and Moslavina, Gold-
stein himself quotes a record from August 30, 1942 on the situation of refugees 
81 Cf. Barić, “Kozara 1942. – sudbina zarobljenika, civila i djece”, pp. 81-91.
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from Kozara in the Požega district, which said that about 10,000 refugees from 
Kozara had been brought to the territory of this district.82 So, the total num-
ber of displaced people is apparently much higher than 16,500, as Goldstein 
claims. In addition to the NDH documents this is confirmed by the contem-
porary Partisan and communist documents. The Headquarters of the 3rd Op-
erational Zone of the People’s Liberation Partisan Units of Croatia estimated 
that number to  “50 to 60 thousand” people in mid-August 194283, and the 
Commission of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Croatia 
for Slavonia assessed in early October 1942 that it was the case of “several tens 
of thousands” of people. 84
Goldstein eventually, “all in all”, concludes that for “several thousand” 
Serbs from Kozara, and “probably up to 15,000” of them, the Jasenovac camps 
“became a tomb” (p. 551). How Goldstein came up with a calculation of “prob-
ably” up to 15,000 Serbs from Kozara killed in Jasenovac, he did not explain. A 
sad impression remains – Goldstein would decrease the number of Serbs from 
Kozara who had been resettled in an area north of Sava to increase the number 
of Serbs – “probably up to 15,000” - who had died in Jasenovac…
When it comes to saving children from Kozara and the role of Diana Bud-
isavljević, Goldstein does not allow anyone to intervene in the life and work 
of the aforementioned lady, so on page 561 he states: “Diana Budisavljević, 
through the Germans who again exerted pressure, forced Dido Kvaternik to 
approve, with much hesitation and with the consent of Pavelić himself, the ex-
traction of children from the camp.” Understandably, nothing that does not fit 
into this is not acceptable. Sources that do not fit were concealed by Goldstein 
because he does not need the “Ustasha propaganda” since he knows the true 
state of things… There is no mention there that Ante Pavelić on July 14, 1942 
told German envoy Siegfried Kasche that the children from Kozara would 
enter state run educational institutions, nor that Lorković (Mladen, not Blaž!, 
a remark to Prof. Goldstein) wrote to Pavelić that in addition to orphans from 
Kozara, parents could be persuaded to allow a majority of other children to 
be  taken for state run education, and thus “the issue of evacuees would be 
substantially simplified” (and then Mrs. Budisavljević worked on “persuading” 
parents to hand over their children). Goldstein also does not mention a memo 
that the Minister of Associations Lovro Sušić sent to the NDH Ministry of 
Health  on August 1, 1942, or  Minister Sušić’s guidelines on the treatment 
82 Miletić, Koncentracioni logor Jasenovac: Dokumenta, Bk. I, doc. no. 172.
83 Građa za historiju narodnooslobodilačkog pokreta u Slavoniji, Bk. II (Slavonski Brod: Historijski 
institut Slavonije, 1963), doc. no. 178.
84 Građa za historiju narodnooslobodilačkog pokreta u Slavoniji, Bk. III (Slavonski Brod: Historijski 
institut Slavonije, 1964), doc. no. 5.
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of those children from August 23 of the same year.85 Why should he refer to 
something that does not suite him? Anyway, just like with that unnecessary 
story about corpses dressed in Home Guard uniforms that were floating in the 
River Sava, he simply cuts pieces out… 
With righteous anger Goldstein lashed out at a “report of the Ministry of 
Associations”, without specifying when that report originated and in what 
context. So he calls out that report when he states that children were not for-
cibly separated from their parents, “which, of course, was a lie” (p. 558). Else-
where, Goldstein points to the “report of the Ministry of Associations” since it 
states that there were no deaths in the transport of children, and finally makes 
a point by concluding that it was a lie and that only in the first transport from 
Jasenovac to Zagreb 17 children died (p. 562–563). 
But, lo and behold, in one document which Goldstein of course did not 
use, Lorković himself (Mladen, not Blaž! I mention to Professor Goldstein 
again just in case) on July 16, 1942 reported – to whom? – Ante Pavelić him-
self! - on the condition of people resettled from Kozara and stated: “The first 
days were more difficult, and on the first transport of children to Zagreb 18 
children died on the train.”86
Goldstein is moralising. He refers to “callous frauds” (p. 48) and “deep 
immorality” (p. 49) of the NDH authorities, assesses the Ustasha “peak of 
sarcasm” (p. 539), warns us of the “dishonesty” of the NDH authorities and 
the “incredibly deceitful manner” of its propaganda (p. 551). In many places, 
Goldstein, unburdened by facts, righteously argues with the NDH documents, 
concluding that what stands in them is a lie, a lie, and a lie again, and this lie 
cowardly cries before Goldstein’s righteous analysis.
From a person who moralizes so much it would be expected not to resort 
to manipulation himself, and much less to fabrications, and I have shown how 
many times Goldstein manipulated sources. Goldstein, after all, admits him-
self the usage of sources the authenticity of which he doubts. Thus he mentions 
the “alleged letter” that Andrija Hebrang wrote from the Ustasha prison, and 
then he uses it nonetheless as a relevant source (p. 388). Since in that alleged 
letter he found something that he liked, so he had to...
But, as Mirjana Gross warned us: “After all, sources are ‘stubborn’ and 
their statements cannot be altered due to specific political needs, but they are 
modified by omitting ‘unsuitable’ parts or by misinterpretation, down to fab-
85 N. Barić, “Kozara 1942. – sudbina zarobljenika, civila i djece”: 98-108.
86 HR-HDA-227, Ministarstvo vanjskih poslova NDH [Ministry of Foreign Affairs of NDH], Ured 
ministra [Office of the Minister], Dnevno izvješće Ministarstva vanjskih poslova broj 42 Poglavniku 
Nezavisne Države Hrvatske [Daily Report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs no. 42 to Poglavnik of 
the Independent State of Croatia], Zagreb, July 16, 1942.
239
Review of Croatian History 16/2020, no. 1, 195-249
ricating. Such a procedure, of course, has nothing to do with science, but it 
can have a significant impact on the historical consciousness of a given time 
and place.”87
But in his book, Goldstein often writes and claims one thing, and in the 
sources or literature referred to in the references there is entirely something 
else. One such example is when Goldstein discusses the possible number of 
Jews killed in the Jasenovac camp. Therefore, regarding the research – calcu-
lation/assessment of Dragan Cvetković from Muzej žrtava genocida (Muse-
um of Genocide Victims) in Belgrade, he states: “Cvetković’s assessment has 
weaknesses already at first glance, because he estimates that around 22,000 
Jews were killed at the Jasenovac camp system, which is not possible - by gen-
eral and multi-confirmed studies of Jasenovac camp victims, among Jews 
there could be no more than 17,000” (p. 790). In footnote 203 on page 931, 
Goldstein, to support this claim, refers to “Cvetković, Stradanje stanovništva 
NDH u logorima – numeričko određenje [The Plight of the Population of the 
Independent State of Croatia in Camps – a numerical overview], [p.] 84; Cv-
etković, Jasenovac u sistemu stradanja civila u NDH [Jasenovac in the system 
of the plight of civilians in NDH], [pp.] 76, 82; Geiger, Brojidbeni pokazatelji o 
žrtvama logora Jasenovac [Numerical indicators of the victims of the Jasenovac 
Camp], [p.] 231”.
Without discussing here Cvetković’s, Goldstein’s or some other calcula-
tions/estimates on the number of Jewish victims of the Jasenovac camp, in the 
said Goldstein’s assertion the only truth is: “which is not possible.” Because 
the figure Goldstein attributes to Cvetković, of “about 22,000 Jew””, Cvetković 
does not state anywhere nor he ever did. Goldstein just made it up. Cvetk-
ović’s article “Stradanje stanovništva NDH u logorima – numeričko određenje 
[The Plight of the Population of the Independent State of Croatia in Camps 
– a numerical overview]” was published in the proceedings Logori, zatvori i 
prisilni rad u Hrvatskoj/Jugoslaviji 1941.-1945. / 1945.-1951. [Camps, Prisons 
and Forced Labour in Croatia/Yugoslavia 1941-1945, 1945-1951] 88 on pp. 41-
56, whilst Goldstein is referring to page 84! The figure of “about 22,000 Jews” 
is not mentioned in this article. In the article “Jasenovac u sistemu stradanja 
civila u NDH – kvantitativna analiza (ili, ponovno o brojevima)” [Jasenovac in 
the system of the plight of civilians in NDH – quantitative analysis (or, again 
about numbers)], published in Jasenovac: Zbornik radova Četvrte međunar-
odne konferencije o Jasenovcu [Jasenovac: Proceedings of the Fourth Interna-
87 M. Gross, Suvremena historiografija, p. 380.
88 Dragan Cvetković, “Stradanje stanovništva NDH u logorima – numeričko određenje”, in: 
Logori, zatvori I prisilni rad u Hrvatskoj/Jugoslaviji 1941.-1945. / 1945.-1951. Zbornik radova, eds. 
Vladimir Geiger, Martina Grahek Ravančić and Marica Karakaš Obradov (Zagreb: Hrvatski institut 
za povijest, 2010), pp. 41-56.
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tional Conference on Jasenovac]89, Cvetković also does not mention “about 
22,000 Jews” at all. In his papers, Cvetković brings a calculation/estimate of 
18,000 to 19,000 Jewish victims of the Jasenovac camp, as I quote in the arti-
cle “Brojidbeni pokazatelji o žrtvama logora Jasenovac, 1941.-1945. (procjene, 
izračuni, popisi)” [“Numerical indicators of victims of the Jasenovac camp, 
1941 - 1945 (estimates, calculations, lists)”] published in 2013 in Časopis za 
suvremenu povijest [Journal of Contemporary History],90 on page 231, which 
Goldstein refers to in his footnote. After all, in the proceedings Jasenovac – 
manipulacije, kontroverze i povijesni revizionizam [Jasenovac – manipulations, 
controversies and historical revisionism] published by JUSP Jasenovac [Public 
Institution Memorial Area Jasenovac] in 2018, in which Goldstein also has 
a contribution,91 Cvetković in his article “Koncentracijski logor Jasenovac i 
njegova uloga u uništavanju naroda NDH – izračun mogućeg broja žrtava 
na temelju djelomično revidiranog popisa iz 1964. godine” [“Jasenovac Con-
centration Camp and its role in the destruction of the nations of NDH – the 
calculation of the possible number of victims based on the partially revised 
1964 census”] specifies his calculation/estimate of the number of Jewish vic-
tims of the Jasenovac camp at 17,926 to 19,076.92 Goldstein, apparently, did 
not read carefully or did not understand what he was reading, because in his 
book he also refers to this Cvetković’s article. Or are there other reasons? Some 
would say “very precisely”, “acribically and responsibly”. It is hard to grasp 
what the reviewers of Goldstein’s book, this “first scientific monograph” on 
the Jasenovac camp, were doing in this case, as in the case of his numerous 
other “excogitations”.
Oddly, after so many years of research, in his “scrupulously” and “acribic-
ally” written book Jasenovac, Goldstein does not mention SS-Obersturmban-
nführer Hermann Alois Krumey, an important, indeed inevitable figure in 
describing the Holocaust and understanding the deportations of Jews also in 
89 Dragan Cvetković, “Jasenovac u sistemu stradanja civila u NDH – kvantitativna analiza (ili, 
ponovo o brojevima)”, in: Jasenovac: Zbornik radova Četvrte međunarodne konferencije o Jaseno-
vcu, eds. Zdravko Antonić and Janko Velimirović (Kozarska Dubica; Banja Luka: Javna ustanova 
Spomen-područja Donja Gradina; Udruženje Jasenovac – Donja Gradina, 2007), pp. 69-82.
90 V. Geiger, “Brojidbeni pokazatelji o žrtvama logora Jasenovac, 1941.-1945. (procjene, izračuni, 
popisi)”, p. 231.
91 Ivo Goldstein, “Zločin i kazna (ili kakva je veza Jasenovca i Bleiburga): Psihološki profili rat-
nih zločinaca iz logora Jasenovac”, in: Jasenovac – manipulacije, kontroverze i povijesni revizionizam: 
Zbornik radova, ed. Andriana Benčić, Stipe Odak and Danijela Lucić (Jasenovac: Javna ustanova 
Spomen-područje Jasenovac, 2018), pp. 65-85.
92 Dragan Cvetković, “Koncentracijski logor Jasenovac i njegova uloga u uništavanju naroda 
NDH – izračun mogućeg broja žrtava na temelju djelomično revidiranog popisa iz 1964. godine”, in: 
Jasenovac – manipulacije, kontroverze i povijesni revizionizam: Zbornik radova, ed. Andriana Benčić, 
Stipe Odak and Danijela Lucić (Jasenovac: Javna ustanova Spomen-područje Jasenovac, 2018), pp. 
193, 195, 198, 201, 206.
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NDH. It is not clear how Goldstein did not consult The Holocaust Encyclope-
dia93, essential for every Holocaust researcher, in which Hermann Krumey’s 
role in the tragic fate of the Jews in NDH is also mentioned. After all, SS-Ober-
sturmbannführer Krumey is mentioned several times in Hannah Arendt’s 
book Eichmann in Jerusalem,94 and he is also mentioned in the books that 
Goldstein listed in the bibliography,95 but which he clearly read superficially. 
Goldstein did not even look at Archives of the German Legation Police En-
voy in Zagreb Hans Helm at the Croatian State Archives in Zagreb, where 
he could also find a note on SS-Obersturmbannführer Krumey.96 I will not 
recount where else in archives and literature there are references on SS-Ober-
sturmbannführer Krumey, but let Prof. Goldstein make some effort and find 
out himself.
Goldstein dedicated plenty of space in his book to prominent Ustasha 
member Vlado Singer (1908-1943) and Chetnik commander [vojvoda] Pavle 
Đurišić (1909–1945), whom he said were killed in the Jasenovac camp (pp. 176, 
186–189, 199, 436, 442, 444, 446, 454, 729–731). If so, it is not clear why Gold-
stein did not ask himself why Singer and Đurišić are no longer on the list of 
victims of the Jasenovac (and Stara Gradiška) camps of the Public Institution 
Memorial Area Jasenovac,97 or perhaps for JUSP the victims of the Jasenovac 
camp (and Stara Gradiška) are only those who are “eligible”. It would also be 
important to find out when and who removed Singer and Đurišić from the list 
of Jasenovac victims, on whose decision and order. Let me remind you– just 
in case – that in a recently published Poimenični popis žrtava koncentracijskog 
logora jasenovac 1941-1945 [ List of Individual Victims of the Jasenovac Concen-
tration Camp 1941-1945] by the Public Institution Memorial Area Jasenovac 
it is stated that Singer was killed in 1943 in the Stara Gradiška Camp  or the 
Jasenovac camp, and that Đurišić was killed in the Jasenovac camp in 1945.98
At the beginning of his book (p.17), Goldstein states, referring to the Jasen-
ovac camp inmate Ilija Jakovljević (Konclogor na Savi [Concentration Camp on 
93 For example, the German edition: Enzyklopädie des Holocaust, Band 2, ed. Eberhard Jäckel 
(Berlin: Argon, 1993), p. 831.
94 H. Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem.
95 For example: Carl Bethke, (K)eine gemeinsame Sprache? Aspekte deutsch-jüdischer Beziehungs-
geschichte in Slawonien, 1900-1945, Studien zur Geschichte, Kultur und Gesellschaft Südosteuropas, 
vol. 12 (Berlin: Lit Verlag, 2013), p. 346; Anna Maria Gruenfelder, Sustigla ih Šoa: Strani židovski 
izbjeglice u Jugoslaviji (1933.-1945.) (Zagreb: Srednja Europa, 2018), p. 205.
96 HR-HDA-1521, Arhiv Helm [Helm Archives], box 7, no. 154 (note Hermann Krumey).
97 Cf. Spomen područje Jasenovac, “Poimenični popis žrtava KCL Jasenovac 1941-1945.” / “Pre-
gled i pretraga poimeničnog popisa žrtava KCL Jasenovac 1941.-1945.”, http://www.jusp-jasenovac.
hr/Default.aspx?sid=7618, accessed on February 10, 2019.
98 Cf. Poimenični popis žrtava koncentracijskog logora Jasenovac 1941.-1945., eds. Jelka Smreka 
and Đorđe Mihovilović (Jasenovac: Spomen-područje Jasenovac, 2007), pp. 444, 1510.
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the Sava River], p. 19), that in future literature on Ustasha camps “there should 
be no fabrications”. Based on the aforementioned, it is quite obvious to what 
extent Goldstein himself has adhered to that.
But all Goldstein’s aforementioned manipulations of sources or their fab-
rication are actually nothing compared to, now already epic, “Goldstein’s bone 
crushing machine”.
Shortly before the publication of his first scientific and acribical book on 
Jasenovac, in the weekly Globus [The Globe] from May 5, 2018, Goldstein 
presented a life-saving idea explaining what happened to the many corpses of 
Jasenovac camps: “At the very end of the war, in early April 1945, several of 
the most prominent Jasenovac butchers returned after two or two and a half 
years to Jasenovac, because they knew exactly the locations of mass graves. 
The order was that ‘traces of graves are to be destroyed at all costs’. In Gradina, 
on the right bank of the River Sava, in those days around 500 camp inmates 
‘were burning corpses and camouflaging mass graves’. Bodies were burned 
on iron crossbeams (which some called a ‘grill’) and ashes returned to the 
tombs. ‘For days, black smoke from burning human remains was rising to 
the sky,’ witnesses wrote. In addition, bone crushing machines were brought 
in from the [German] Reich. When pathologists opened some tombs in 1964, 
they discovered that many corpses had already ‘rotted and disintegrated’ and 
that somewhere ‘human tissue turned into a soapy mass of yellowish-orange 
colour’. And what would be discovered today, 75 years after the crime?”99
On June 17, 2018 on Croatian television in the show Nedjeljom u 2 [On 
Sunday at 2 p.m.] Goldstein repeated the story of the alleged special machines 
from the German Reich, used to crush and grind the bones of corpses in Jasen-
ovac, thus concealing the crime. Then he stated: “[Miroslav] Filipović Majstor-
ović [...] knew those tombs the best. He went to Chełmno to instruct with the 
Nazis on how to destroy corpses, they even brought in machines that destroy 
bones. And they were [...] therefore in the beginning of April [1945], some 
500 to 600 camp inmates were working on this destruction, systematically to 
destroy corpses. In part, they were burned on bars, and then the ashes were 
returned to the tombs. In other part, the bones, which they found, or excavat-
ed, were destroyed in these machines” 100 How many of these machines (“bone 
crushers”) were there, and when and how their every trace was lost, Goldstein 
did not explain. 
Goldstein’s abovementioned statements about the “bone crushing ma-
chine” stirred the masses and attracted the attention of the “fair intelligentsia”. 
99 I. Goldstein, “Komisija za Jasenovac: nova besmislena inicijativa šefice države”.
100 Cf. “NU2 – IVO GOLDSTEIN”, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-2c79KryKCM, accessed 
on February 15, 2019.
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It was expected that in the first scientific, scrupulously and acribically written 
book he would finally provide concrete information on the existence of the 
German bone crusher in Jasenovac. But everyone who expected it was left dis-
appointed. In the book Jasenovac Goldstein again camouflaged the whole story 
in a new way. He reiterates that the Jasenovac Camp Command at the end of 
the war sought to cover up the traces of crime and insisted that the “traces 
of graves” be destroyed at all costs. He further explains: “Although there is 
no immediate evidence, the way the Ustashas burned corpses in Jasenovac is 
strikingly similar to the method of burning corpses used by the Nazis from 
1941 (in Babi Yar and elsewhere in the USSR).” Then Goldstein scrupulously 
adds that the Ustashas “could learn” how to destroy corpses from members of 
the Prinz Eugen SS Division, since among them were former guards at camp 
Chełmno, where such methods were used, as well as from some vaguely de-
fined “other group” of Germans who burned corpses in the Jajinci camp near 
Belgrade in the end of 1943 and the beginning of 1944 (pp. 726–727).
It is not difficult to get basic information about Babi Yar (Ukrainian: 
Бабин Яр, Russian: Бабий Яр) and how the Nazis destroyed traces of their 
crimes there.101 It is also easy to get data on the German bone crushing ma-
chine, primarily on Wikipedia 102 This machine was called Knochenmühle in 
German and костедробилки in Ukrainian and Russian. Information on the 
German camp Chełmno (German: Vernichtungslager Kulmhof) in occupied 
Poland is also easy to find.103
Undoubtedly, Goldstein found inspiration for resolving the issue of the 
removal  of mass graves in the Jasenovac Camp in the famous Sonderaktion 
1005, in which the Nazis were using the above methods to destroy the mass 
graves of the victims of their concentration camps in Eastern Europe, Poland 
and Ukraine from 1942 until 1944.104
Not only did Goldstein not specify in his book where he found data and 
evidence for the grand discovery that would explain one of the greatest dilem-
mas and controversies in Croatian history regarding the question of where 
the bodies of - according to Goldstein himself, about 90,000 to 100,000 vic-
tims, were buried, but after everything he had previously stated in public, 
101 Cf. “Babi Yar”, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Babi_Yar, accessed on November 20, 2018.
102 For example cf. “Holocaust”, https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Holocaust, accessed on February 
10, 2019 and “View of the bone crushing machine used by Sonderkommando 1005 in the Janowska 
concentration camp to grind the bones of victims after their bodies were burned”, https://collections.
ushmm.org/search/catalog/pa10007, accessed on November 20, 2018.
103 Cf. “Chełmno extermination camp”, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chełmno_extermination_
camp, accessed on November 20, 2018.
104 Cf. “Sonderaktion 1005”, https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sonderaktion_1005, accessed 10. 11. 
2018. ili https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sonderaktion_1005, accessed on November 10, 2018.
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in the book Jasenovac, I repeat and emphasize, he did not mention German 
bone-crushing machines at all. Unbelievable! Goldstein also did not specify 
on the basis of which source he stated that Miroslav Filipović Majstorović 
visited Chełmno. In his latest book he actually confirms that everything he 
previously claimed related to that issue is actually a lie, since he writes there is 
no direct evidence that the Ustashas “learned” from the Nazis how to destroy 
corpses (p. 726).
However, Goldstein does not give up, so he states that the Ustashas could 
have “learned” how to burn corpses from, for example, members of the Ger-
man SS Division Prinz Eugen because some of them previously served in the 
Chełmno camp. Understandably, Goldstein has no sources to support this 
assumption. Why would a combat SS division have any contact or cooperate 
with the Ustasha Defence, which was associated with managing the Jasenovac 
Camp itself? So, instead of at least apologizing in the book for inventing Ger-
man machines for crushing bones of human corpses, to apologize for claiming 
that Miroslav Filipović Majstorović visited Chełmno, he continues with his 
constructions...
In scientific approach all claims and assertions, including those regarding 
the Jasenovac camp, should also have credible confirmation – “there should be 
no fabrications”. However, Goldstein clearly does not have any specific sources 
that the aforementioned German machine was used in Jasenovac, even though 
he trumpeted about it in his media appearances. Maybe him too realized that 
inventing must have some limits? Goldstein does not have any specific sources 
that the Ustashas “could have learned” anything from members of the Prinz 
Eugen SS Division. Still, I am afraid, these assertions will be embraced and 
persistently repeated by many, even though Goldstein has no relevant sources 
to support them. 
Hence Goldstein is actually highly ranked in the catalogue of various fab-
rications about the Jasenovac camp. But what Goldstein has no source for, he 
will find in his mind. Thus, the essential formula used in the lack of credible, 
or even any indicators, is simple – what does not exist can be concocted. A 
scientific approach? Maybe for Goldstein! But Goldstein is not the only one.
Before long one of Goldstein’s faithful and steadfast like-minded col-
leagues, who also proved himself as a reviewer of his book Jasenovac, his-
torian Goran Hutinec (Department of History, Faculty of Humanities and 
Social Sciences, University of Zagreb), in the weekly Nacional [The National] 
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from January 15, 2019 repeated Goldstein’s story on how bodies of Jasenovac 
inmates were removed from the mass graves.105
I have no doubt at all that there were mass graves of Jasenovac camp in-
mates – numerous sources confirm this. But Hutinec’s “sensational discovery” 
of an aerial footage of Jasenovac from January 1945 (on which little or almost 
nothing can be seen – i.e. everyone sees what they want) does not confirm it 
at all. Hutinec’s explanations regarding the importance of the aerial footage 
found, and, I must not forget to particularly emphasise – the way of removing 
the corpses of Jasenovac camp inmates – presented in weekly Nacional are 
nothing but plain speculations. If historian Hutinec, or anyone else, sees mass 
graves on that aerial footage, I really doubt they were where he puts them in 
his fantasy. Hutinec’s story - to be blunt - is exaggerated and utterly serbisized. 
Since Hutinec announced that he would write and publish a scientific paper 
detailing who, when and how removed the Jasenovac mass graves, it is not 
difficult to assume who will be the reviewer who will give positive feedback 
on the paper.
Israeli historian Gideon Greif, author of the– fortunately for all of us – 
in Serbia recently published book Jasenovac – Auschwitz of the Balkans,106 in 
which he scrupulously listed that the Ustashas invented a total of 57 methods 
of sadistic killings of their victims, primarily Serbs, and argued that in Jase-
novac “perhaps even 800,00 Serbs, Jews and Roma could have been killed”, 
expresses the opinion that “the new footages reveal a new fact, that is, the 
existence of much larger mass graves scattered on the surface of at least ten sq. 
km. These footages are one of the final proofs on the bases of which we will, I 
am afraid, have to even increase the number of people killed at Jasenovac from 
700,000 or 800,000, which are today’s estimates”.107 If Greif, as “a world-re-
nowned Israeli expert on Auschwitz and other World War II death factories”, 
as presented in Serbia, is right – Goldstein’s “bone crushing machines” would 
105 Cf. Zrinka Vrabec Mojzeš, “Goran Hutinec intervju: ‘Otkrio sam američke snimke koje poka-
zuju da su u Jasenovcu postojale masovne grobnice’[“Interview with Goran Hutinec. ‘I have discov-
ered American footages showing that there were mass graves in Jasenovac’”], Nacional (Zagreb), no. 
1082, January 15, 2019., pp. 15-18.
106 Gideon Greif, Jasenovac – Auschwitz of the Balkans: The Ustasha Empire of Cruelty (Belgrade: 
Knjiga komerc, 2018).
107 [Gideon Grajf:] “U Jasenovcu je ubijeno možda i 800.000 Srba, Jevreja i Roma, o tome se NE 
SME ĆUTATI” [Gideon Greif: “In Jasenovac perhaps even 800,00 Serbs, Jews, and Roma were 
killed, and we MUST NOT BE QUIET ABOUT THAT”], https://www.blic.rs/vesti/svet/u-jaseno-
vcu-je-ubijeno-mozda-i-800000-srba-jevreja-i-roma-o-tome-se-ne-sme-cutati/r7h3pn8, accessed 
on February 15, 2019; Slobodan Kljakić, “Intervju: Profesor Dr Gideon Grajf, dobitnik Sretenjske 
zlatne medalje: Zajednički bedem pred revizijom prošlosti” [Slobodan Kljakić, “Interview: Professor 
Gideon Greif, PhD, winner of the Sretenje (Serbian National Day) Gold Medal: A common bul-
wark against the revision of the past”], http://www.politika.rs/scc/clanak/422959/Zajednicki-be-
dem-pred-revizijom-proslosti, accessed on February 15,  2019.
246
REVIEW
make sense. The only trouble is that Greif thinks Goldstein is a revisionist and 
accuses him of being “in line with the narrative of the State of Croatia – 83,000 
victims”.108 - It would be best if Goldstein, Hutinec and Greif met and agreed 
on the number, size and distribution of Jasenovac mass graves and the ways in 
which the Ustashas removed them. In fact, they can invite Vasilije Krestić, Sr-
boljub Živanović, Roman Leljak and Stjepan Razum, as well as other truthful 
connoisseurs, so they could together draw some clever conclusion.
This latest Goldstein’s book, as all of his previous books, had been in var-
ious media favourable to him announced for years in advance. Its emergence 
and Goldstein’s research efforts were followed. As if it was a long-awaited male 
firstborn in a royal family. It was announced to be the best book about the 
Jasenovac camp and the “last say” on the subject. It all intensified a few days 
before the long-awaited firstborn saw the light of day and when Goldstein’s 
book (“the first scientific monograph” on the Jasenovac Camp) was, luckily 
for all of us, published, it was followed by – as it fits the occasion - numerous 
inappropriate eulogies.
Shortly after the publication of Goldstein’s book Jasenovac in the daily Ju-
tarnji list  [Morning Paper] from November 11, 2018 Robert Bajruši stated: “Ivo 
Goldstein’s book is the most important journalistic title published this year in 
Croatia.”109 Some would say – it is also an instruction that Goldstein’s book 
Jasenovac should be nominated for at least one of the prestigious Croatian sci-
entific prizes, and possibly also a new incentive for Goldstein to be elected to 
the Croatian Academy of Sciences and Arts. Miljenko Jergović argued in Za-
greb daily Jutarnji list [Morning Paper] on November 20, 2018 that Goldstein’s 
book: “is very accurate, documented and to an extent objectivized portrait of 
the most distinguished concentration camp in Europe with a command that 
was not German.”110
The presentation of Goldstein’s book Jasenovac at Novinarski dom [the 
Journalists’ Building] on November 21, 2018 in Zagreb received accolades 
from the Croatian press. Thus, for example, the daily Novi list reported on the 
108 Gideon Grajf, “Jasenovac – Aušvic Balkana: Kontroverze o broju žrtava” [Gideon Grajf, “Jase-
novac - Auschwitz of the Balkans. Controversies on the number of casualties”], Politika (Belgrade), 
no. 37809, February 15 and 16, 2019, p. 19.
109 Robert Bajruši, “Knjiga Ive Goldsteina najvažniji je publicistički naslov izdan ove godine 
u Hrvatskoj” [“Ivo Goldstein’s book is the most important journalistic title published this year in 
Croatia”], https://www.jutarnji.hr/vijesti/hrvatska/knjiga-ive-goldsteina-najvazniji-je-publicis-
ticki-naslov-izdan-ove-godine-u-hrvatskoj/8041322/, accessed on September 20, 2018.
110 Miljenko Jergović, “Interliber je bio tržnica starog papira, a ne sajam knjižnih noviteta” [“In-
terliber was an old paper market, not a novelty book fair”], https://www.jutarnji.hr/komentari/
interliber-je-bio-trznica-starog-papira-a-ne-sajam-knjiznih-noviteta/8075915/, accessed  on No-
vember 20, 2018.
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book with an article entitled “Scientific monograph. A book that causes night-
mares. Ivo Goldstein’s ‘Jasenovac’ ‘a good barrier to negationism.’”.111
It is undoubtedly the intention of persistent individuals and groups to cre-
ate the impression in public that Goldstein’s book Jasenovac is the crown of his 
research, indeed the last scientific say on the subject. Thus the panel discus-
sion ‘The History in Society’ with the significant (and somewhat funny) title 
Jasenovac by Ivo Goldstein - what next? was held in the Hall of the Faculty of 
Humanities and Social Sciences in Zagreb on December 13, 2018. Alongside 
Goldstein, several historians, his like-minded colleagues, took part in the dis-
cussion.112
Miljenko Jergović, as the most persistent promoter of the life and work 
of Ivo Goldstein, repeats the eulogies, so on January 2, 2019 he assures us: 
“Ivo Goldstein’s book ‘Jasenovac’ is not only a brilliantly performed historical 
synthesis of the research on ‘Balkan Auschwitz’ and a kind of completion of 
what generations of historians have worked on and the survived camp in-
mates, including some of the most important Croatian writers of our century 
(Ilija Jakovljević), witnessed, but it is a book of very strong cathartic potential, 
which represents a kind of dam against the advancing historical revisionism 
and the hysteria of the newly composed righteous and innocent. Public honour 
is defended by the manner in which an individual treats public shame. Ivo 
Goldstein is one of such Croatian individuals, and he makes Croatia a some-
what better and more honest country. [...].”113
At the end of his latest book, Goldstein says its “intension” was to “narrow 
the space for lies” about Jasenovac. And when you “face the Jasenovac truth”, 
Goldstein tells us, “then you make Croatia a less terrible place” (pp. 800–801). 
Well, Croatia, I am afraid, truly is a quite scary place if a professor of the De-
partment of History at the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences Univer-
sity of Zagreb (“the most important department of history in the Republic of 
Croatia”, “the oldest and largest Croatian scientific-teaching institution that 
educates future history teachers”) can write in his book in a manner described 
111 Boris Pavelić, “Znanstvena monografija: Knjiga koja izaziva noćne more: ‘Jasenovac’ Ive Gold-
steina ‘dobra brana negacionizmu’” [“Scientific monograph: A book that causes nightmares: Ivo 
Goldstein’s ‘Jasenovac’ is a good barrier against negationism’”], http://www.novilist.hr/Vijesti/Hr-
vatska/KNJIGA-KOJA-IZAZIVA-NOCNE-MORE-Jasenovac-Ive-Goldsteina-dobra-brana-nega-
cionizmu, accessed on November 25, 2018.
112 “Tribina ‘Historija u društvu’: ‘Jasenovac’ Ive Goldsteina – što poslije?”, http://www.historio-
grafija.hr/?p=12777, accessed on December 15, 2018.
113 Miljenko Jergović, “15 knjiga zbog kojih mi je valjala 2018. godina” [“15 books that made 2018 
a good year for me”], https://www.jergovic.com/ajfelov-most/15-knjiga-zbog-kojih-mi-je-valjala-
2018-godina/, accessed  on November 5, 2018.
248
REVIEW
in this review. When I wrote about some of Goldstein’s other excogitations, 114 I 
stated — and I repeat it here — that someone wise said that our historians are 
in many cases more of an embarrassment than our history.
Kurz und klar – there are many shortcomings to Goldstein’s latest book 
Jasenovac, a compendium of all kinds of ignorance, incompetence and sloppi-
ness, and far, far too far, would lead us to list all factual errors and interpretive 
improvisations – all inaccuracies, untruths, half-truths and nonsense. In this 
review [which is really only eine kleine Einführung about Goldstein’s scien-
tific contributions] I have made only some more important and picturesque 
remarks. 
And not to forget – after my recently published shorter reviews and re-
marks on his book Jasenovac,115 Goldstein, so I learned, for the Serbian edition 
116 of his book –  “the first scientific monograph” about the Jasenovac camp, 
hurriedly made corrections of the most remarkable inaccuracies that I warned 
about at the time. It is yet another prof of his scrupulousness and meticulous-
ness.
In her review to the Serbian edition of Goldstein’s book Jasenovac, Prof. 
Dubravka Stojanović (Department of History at the Faculty of Philosophy in 
Belgrade) notes: “By having extremely diverse archival documents and, in par-
ticular, applying new scientific methods, Goldstein has reconstructed life in 
the camp, from the way the inmates were killed to many data from everyday 
life. Thanks to his long-time work on Holocaust issues, Goldstein managed 
to fit the Jasenovac camp into the European context of mass destruction of 
‘undesirable’ nations and by that place it in the trends of European and world 
history.” What those “new scientific methods” are and which “trends of Eu-
ropean and world history” are in question here, is, besides Prof. Stojanović, 
probably clear to someone. Not to me. 
114 Cf. Vladimir Geiger, “Goldsteinologija: Biseri za nezaborav: Krivotvorenje je intelektualni pri-
jestup” [“Goldsteinology: Jewels to Remember: Counterfeiting is an intellectual property offense”], 
Hrvatsko slovo (Zagreb), no. 790, June 11, 2010, p. 14.
115 Vladimir Geiger, “‘Znanstvena’ monografija o Jasenovcu: Goldsteinovo pomanjkanje izvora i 
vjerodostojnih pokazatelja: Ivo Goldstein, Jasenovac, Fraktura i Javna ustanova Spomen-područ-
je Jasenovac, Zaprešić – Jasenovac, 2018.” [“Scientific monograph on Jasenovac: Goldstein’s lack of 
sources and credible indicators: Ivo Goldstein, Jasenovac, Fraktura and the Public Institution Me-
morial Area Jasenovac, Zaprešić – Jasenovac, 2018”], Hrvatsko slovo, br. 1232, November 30, 2018, 
pp. 14 and 19 and Vladimir Geiger, “Kapitalno djelo hrvatske trivijalne historiografije: Ivo Goldstein, 
Jasenovac, Fraktura i Javna ustanova Spomen-područje Jasenovac, Zaprešić – Jasenovac, 2018.” [“A 
masterpiece of Croatian trivial historiography: Ivo Goldstein, Jasenovac, Fraktura and the Public 
Institution Memorial Area Jasenovac, Zaprešić – Jasenovac, 2018”], Politički zatvorenik (Zagreb), no. 
277, October-November-December 2018, pp. 23-28.
116 Ivo Goldstein, Jasenovac (Novi Sad: Akademska knjiga, 2019).
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Much has been said and written about the Jasenovac Camp “by heart”, 
both in public and in the media, and even in historiography, allegations and 
claims are repeated without reservation from the left and the right. The facts 
about the Jasenovac camp have been contaminated from the beginning, and 
we are witnessing contamination from various sides the end of which is dif-
ficult to see. Precise and accurate establishment of facts about the Jasenovac 
camp is only possible by verifying and corroborating all allegations and data. 
This in turn requires time, effort, and responsibility.
In the research of the Jasenovac camp victims and the extent of the crimes 
committed, most often the problem is lack of not only sources and credible 
indicators, but also “goodwill”, and also “common sense” to properly address 
certain issues. In his latest book Jasenovac Goldstein showed neither “good-
will” nor “common sense”, on the contrary he continues to lobotomize us by 
expressing everything but the willingness and ability to engage in scientific 
approach.
Vladimir Geiger
